The 2003 invasion of Iraq was the first stage of the Iraq War. The invasion began on 20 March 2003 and lasted just over one month, including 26 days of major combat operations. The invasion was conducted by a United States–led coalition of mainly American, British, Australian, and Polish troops. According to US president George W. Bush and UK prime minister Tony Blair, the coalition aimed to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)—nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons—and "free the Iraqi people" by deposing president Saddam Hussein, in turn ending his "support for terrorism". Before the invasion, United Nations (UN) inspectors in Iraq had found no evidence of Iraqi WMDs; US and British officials claimed they were still hidden, and posed an immediate threat to world peace. The invasion was strongly opposed by some long-standing US allies, including Canada, France, Germany, and New Zealand. In 2004, UN secretary-general Kofi Annan called the invasion illegal under international law, as a breach of the UN Charter. On 15 February 2003, there were worldwide protests against the anticipated invasion of Iraq, including a rally of three million people in Rome which was the largest anti-war rally in history. The invasion began with an airstrike on the Presidential Palace in Baghdad on 20 March 2003. The following day, coalition forces launched an incursion into Basra Governorate from their massing point close to the Iraqi–Kuwaiti border. While special forces launched an amphibious assault from the Persian Gulf to secure Basra and the surrounding petroleum fields, the main invasion army occupied southern Iraq, engaging in the Battle of Nasiriyah on 23 March. Massive air strikes across the country and against Iraqi command and control threw the defending army into chaos and prevented an effective resistance. On 26 March, the 173rd Airborne Brigade was airdropped near the northern city of Kirkuk, where they joined forces with Kurdish rebels and fought several actions against the Iraqi Army, to secure the northern part of the country. The main body of coalition forces continued their drive into the heart of Iraq and were met with little resistance. Most of the Iraqi military was quickly defeated. On 9 April 2003, 22 days after the first day of the invasion, the capital city of Baghdad was captured by coalition forces after the six-day-long Battle of Baghdad. Other operations included the capture and occupation of Kirkuk on 10 April and the attack on and capture of Tikrit on 15 April. Saddam and the Iraqi central leadership went into hiding, as the coalition forces finished occupying the country. On 1 May, Bush declared the "end of major combat operations" in Iraq; this began the occupation phase of the Iraq War, in which coalition forces fought the Iraqi insurgency. Saddam was captured by US forces on 13 December 2003.
Prelude to the invasion
=== Background === The Gulf War began in 1990, and ended in 1991 with a ceasefire between the United Nations coalition and Iraq. The U.S. and its allies tried to keep Saddam Hussein in check with military actions such as Operation Southern Watch, by monitoring and controlling some Iraqi airspace, as well as using economic sanctions. Violating the Biological Weapons Convention, Iraq's biological weapons (BW) program began in the early 1980s, with help from the U.S. and European countries reportedly unaware of Iraq's intentions. Details of Iraqi biological and chemical weapons program surfaced after the Gulf War, following investigations by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), which had been charged with the post-war disarmament of Iraq. The investigation concluded that the program had not continued after the war. The U.S. and its allies then maintained a policy of "containment" towards Iraq, involving numerous economic sanctions by the UN Security Council (UNSC); the enforcement of Iraqi no-fly zones declared by the U.S. and the UK to protect the Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan and Shias in the south from aerial attacks by the Iraqi government; and ongoing inspections. Iraqi military helicopters and planes regularly contested the no-fly zones.
In 1998, regime change in Iraq became official U.S. foreign policy with enactment of the Iraq Liberation Act, enacted following the expulsion of UN weapons inspectors months earlier (some had been accused of spying for the U.S.). The act provided $97 million for Iraqi "democratic opposition organizations" to "establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq." This legislation contrasted with the terms set out in UNSC Resolution 687, which focused on weapons and weapons programs and made no mention of regime change. One month later, the U.S. and UK bombed Iraq during Operation Desert Fox, their rationale being to hamper Iraq's ability to produce chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, but U.S. intelligence personnel also hoped it would help weaken Saddam's grip on power.
With George W. Bush's inauguration in January 2001, the U.S. moved towards a more aggressive policy toward Iraq. The Republican Party's 2000 campaign platform called for the U.S. to "remove" Saddam. After leaving the Bush administration, Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill said that an attack on Iraq had been planned since Bush's inauguration, and that the first U.S. National Security Council meeting involved discussion of an invasion. O'Neill later backtracked, saying that these discussions were part of a continuation of foreign policy first put into place by the Clinton administration. Despite the Bush administration's stated interest in invading Iraq, little formal movement towards an invasion occurred until the 11 September attacks (9/11).
September 11 attacks
On the morning of 11 September 2001, the al-Qaeda militant organization, led by Osama bin Laden, committed four coordinated terrorist attacks on the U.S., using hijacked commercial airliners to crash into major symbols of American economic and military power. Nearly 3,000 people were killed. Messages intercepted by the National Security Agency during the attacks pointed to al-Qaeda's responsibility for them. By mid-afternoon, however, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered the Pentagon to prepare plans for attacking Iraq. According to aides near him that day, Rumsfeld messaged: "Best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit S.H. [Saddam Hussein] at same time. Not only UBL [Usama bin Laden]". According to the 9/11 Commission Report, "Rumsfeld later explained that at the time, he had been considering either one of them, or perhaps someone else, as the responsible party." On 12 September, Bush ordered White House counter-terrorism coordinator Richard A. Clarke to investigate possible Iraqi involvement in 9/11. Shocked by the sophistication of the attacks, the administration wondered whether a state sponsor was involved. Clarke's office issued a memo on 18 September that noted wide ideological gaps between Iraq and al-Qaeda, and that only weak anecdotal evidence linked the two. A 21 September briefing to Bush indicated that U.S. intelligence had no evidence linking Saddam to the attacks, and there was "scant credible evidence that Iraq had any significant collaborative ties with al-Qaeda." The PDB wrote off the few contacts that existed between Saddam's government and al-Qaeda as attempts to monitor the group, not work with it. However, U.S. vice president Dick Cheney and Rumsfeld expressed skepticism toward's the CIA's intelligence. They questioned whether the CIA were competent enough to produce accurate information as the agency underestimated threats and failed to accurately predict events such as the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. They instead preferred outside analysis, of which information was supplied by the Iraqi National Congress as well as unvetted pieces of intelligence. This information alleged that a highly secretive relationship existed between Saddam and al-Qaeda from 1992, specifically through a series of meetings reportedly involving the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS). The rationale for invading Iraq as a response to 9/11 has been widely questioned, as there was no cooperation between Saddam and al-Qaeda. On 20 September 2001, Bush addressed a joint session of Congress (telecast live to the world), and announced his new "war on terror". This announcement was accompanied by the doctrine of "pre-emptive" military action, later termed the Bush Doctrine. On 21 November, Bush spoke with Rumsfeld and instructed him to conduct a confidential review of OPLAN 1003, the war plan for invading Iraq. Rumsfeld met with General Tommy Franks, the commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), on 27 November to go over the plans. A record of the meeting includes the question "How start?", listing multiple possible justifications for a U.S.–Iraq War. Some Bush advisers favored an immediate invasion of Iraq, while others advocated building an international coalition and obtaining UN authorization. Bush eventually decided to seek UN authorization, while still reserving the option of invading without it. General David Petraeus recalled in an interview his experience during the time before the invasion, stating that "When we were getting ready for what became the invasion of Iraq, the prevailing wisdom was that we were going to have a long, hard fight to Baghdad, and it was really going to be hard to take Baghdad. The road to deployment, which was a very compressed road for the 101st Airborne Division, started with a seminar on military operations in urban terrain, because that was viewed as the decisive event in the takedown of the regime in Iraq — that and finding and destroying the weapons of mass destruction."
Diplomatic preparations
While there had been some earlier talk of action against Iraq, the Bush administration waited until September 2002 to call for action, with White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card saying, "From a marketing point of view, you don't introduce new products in August." Bush began formally making his case to the international community for an invasion of Iraq in his 12 September address to the UN General Assembly. Also that day, Benjamin Netanyahu testified before the U.S. Congress, using expert testimony to encourage an invasion, and stating there was "no question" that Saddam was working on WMDs. The UK agreed with the U.S. actions, while France and Germany were critical of plans to invade Iraq, arguing instead for continued diplomacy and weapons inspections. After considerable debate, the UNSC adopted a compromise resolution, UNSC Resolution 1441, which authorized the resumption of weapons inspections and promised "serious consequences" for non-compliance. UNSC members France and Russia made clear that they did not consider these consequences to include the use of force to overthrow the Iraqi government. Both the U.S. ambassador to the UN, John Negroponte, and the UK ambassador, Jeremy Greenstock, publicly confirmed this reading of the resolution, assuring that Resolution 1441 provided no "automaticity" or "hidden triggers" for an invasion without further consultation of the UNSC. Resolution 1441 gave Iraq "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" and set up inspections by the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Saddam accepted the resolution on 13 November and inspectors returned to Iraq under the direction of UNMOVIC chairman Hans Blix and IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei. As of February 2003, the IAEA "found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq"; the IAEA concluded that certain items which could have been used in nuclear enrichment centrifuges, such as aluminum tubes, were in fact intended for other uses. UNMOVIC "did not find evidence of the continuation or resumption" of WMD programs, or significant quantities of proscribed items. UNMOVIC did supervise the destruction of a small number of empty chemical rocket warheads, 50 liters of mustard gas that had been declared by Iraq and sealed by UNSCOM in 1998, and laboratory quantities of a mustard gas precursor, along with about 50 Al-Samoud missiles of a design that Iraq stated did not exceed the permitted 150 km range, but which had traveled up to 183 km in tests. Shortly before the invasion, UNMOVIC stated that it would take "months" to verify Iraqi compliance with resolution 1441. In October 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the Iraq Resolution, which authorized the President to "use any means necessary" against Iraq. Americans polled in January 2003 widely favored further diplomacy over an invasion. Later that year, however, Americans began to agree with Bush's plan. The U.S. government engaged in an elaborate domestic public relations campaign to market the war to its citizens. Americans overwhelmingly believed Saddam did have WMDs: 85% said so, even though the inspectors had not uncovered those weapons. Of those who thought Iraq had weapons sequestered somewhere, about half responded that said weapons would not be found in combat. By February 2003, 64% of Americans supported taking military action to remove Saddam from power.
In the 2003 State of the Union address, Bush said "we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs". On 5 February, U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell addressed the UNSC, continuing U.S. efforts to gain UN authorization for an invasion. His presentation contained a computer-generated image of a "mobile biological weapons laboratory". However, this information was based on claims of Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, codenamed "Curveball", an Iraqi emigrant living in Germany who later admitted that his claims had been false. Powell falsely alleged that Iraq had ties to al-Qaeda. As a follow-up to the presentation, the U.S., UK, Poland, Italy, Australia, Denmark, Japan, and Spain proposed a resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq, but Canada, France, Germany, and Russia strongly urged continued diplomacy. Facing a losing vote as well as a likely veto from France and Russia; the aforementioned countries eventually withdrew their resolution. Opposition to the invasion coalesced in the worldwide 15 February 2003 anti-war protest that attracted between six and ten million people in more than 800 cities, the largest such protest in human history.
On 16 March 2003, Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, Bush, and Prime Minister of Portugal José Manuel Durão Barroso as host met in the Azores to discuss the invasion of Iraq and Spain's potential involvement in the war, as well as the beginning of the invasion. This encounter was extremely controversial in Spain, even now remaining a very sensitive point for the Aznar government. In 2004, Madrid suffered the worst terrorist attack in Europe since the Lockerbie bombing, motivated by Spain's decision to participate in the war, prompting some Spaniards to accuse the Prime Minister of being responsible. In March 2003, the U.S., UK, Poland, Australia, Spain, Denmark preparing for the invasion of Iraq, with a host of public relations and military moves. In his 17 March address to the nation, Bush demanded that Saddam and his two sons, Uday and Qusay, surrender and leave Iraq, giving them a 48-hour deadline. The UK House of Commons held a debate on going to war on 18 March where the government motion was approved 412 to 149. The vote was a key moment in the history of the Blair administration, as the number of government MPs who rebelled against the vote was the greatest since the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. Three government ministers resigned in protest at the war, John Denham, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and the then Leader of the House of Commons Robin Cook. In a passionate speech to the House of Commons after his resignation, he said, "What has come to trouble me is the suspicion that if the 'hanging chads' of Florida had gone the other way and Al Gore had been elected, we would not now be about to commit British troops to action in Iraq." During the debate, it was stated that the Attorney General had advised that the war was legal under previous UN Resolutions.
Last diplomatic efforts
In December 2002, a representative of Iraqi General Tahir Jalil Habbush al-Tikriti, contacted former CIA Counterterrorism Department head Vincent Cannistraro, and stated that Saddam "knew there was a campaign to link him to 11 September and prove he had [WMDs]". Cannistraro added that "the Iraqis were prepared to satisfy these concerns. I reported the conversation to senior levels of the state department and I was told to stand aside and they would handle it." Cannistraro stated that the offers made were all "killed" by the Bush administration because they allowed Saddam to remain in power, an outcome viewed as unacceptable. It has been suggested that Saddam was prepared to go into exile if allowed to keep U.S.$1 billion. Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak's national security advisor, Osama El-Baz, sent a message to the U.S. State Department that the Iraqis wanted to discuss the accusations that the country had WMDs and ties with al-Qaeda. Iraq also attempted to reach the U.S. through the Syrian, French, German, and Russian intelligence services. In January 2003, Lebanese-American Imad Hage met with U.S. Department of Defense official Michael Maloof. Hage, a resident of Beirut, had been recruited by the department to assist in the war on terror. He reported that Mohammed Nassif, a close aide to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, had expressed frustrations about the difficulties of Syria contacting the U.S., and had attempted to use him as an intermediary. Maloof arranged for Hage to meet with Richard Perle, then head of the Defense Policy Board. In January 2003, Hage met with Iraqi intelligence official Hassan al-Obeidi. Al-Obeidi told Hage that Baghdad did not understand why they were targeted and that they had no WMDs. He then made the offer for Washington to send in 2000 FBI agents to confirm this. He additionally offered petroleum concessions but stopped short of having Saddam give up power, instead suggesting that elections could be held in two years. Later, al-Obeidi suggested that Hage travel to Baghdad for talks; he accepted. Later that month, Hage met with General Habbush and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz. He was offered top priority to U.S. firms in oil and mining rights, UN-supervised elections, U.S. inspections (with up to 5,000 inspectors), to have al-Qaeda agent Abdul Rahman Yasin (in Iraqi custody since 1994) handed over as a sign of good faith, and to give "full support for any U.S. plan" in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. They also wished to meet with high-ranking U.S. officials. On 19 February, Hage faxed Maloof his report of the trip. Maloof reports having brought the proposal to Jaymie Duran. The Pentagon denies that either Wolfowitz or Rumsfeld, Duran's bosses, were aware of the plan. On 21 February, Maloof informed Duran in an email that Richard Perle wished to meet with Hage and the Iraqis if the Pentagon would clear it. Duran responded "Mike, working this. Keep this close hold." On 7 March, Perle met with Hage in Knightsbridge, and stated that he wanted to pursue the matter further with people in Washington, D.C. (both have acknowledged the meeting). A few days later, he informed Hage that Washington refused to let him meet with Habbush to discuss the offer (Hage stated that Perle's response was "that the consensus in Washington was it was a no-go"). Perle told The Times, "The message was 'Tell them that we will see them in Baghdad.′"
Rationale
According to Tommy Franks, the objectives of the invasion were to:
Depose's Saddam government Identify, isolate, and eliminate Iraqi WMDs Find, capture, and drive out terrorists from Iraq Collect intelligence related to terrorist networks, and to "the global network" of WMDs End sanctions Deliver humanitarian support to the Iraqi people, including the displaced Secure Iraq's oil fields and resources, "which belong to the Iraqi people" Help the Iraqi people "create conditions for a transition to a representative self-government" Throughout 2002, the Bush administration insisted that removing Saddam from power to restore international peace and security was a major goal. The principal stated justifications for this policy of "regime change" were that Iraq's continuing production of WMDs and known ties to terrorist organizations, as well as Iraq's continued violations of UNSC resolutions, amounted to a threat to the U.S. and the world community. Bush, speaking in October 2002, said that "The stated policy of the United States is regime change. ... However, if Saddam were to meet all the conditions of the United Nations, the conditions that I have described very clearly in terms that everybody can understand, that in itself will signal the regime has changed." Citing reports from certain intelligence sources, Bush stated on 6 March 2003 that he believed that Saddam was not complying with UN Resolution 1441.
=== Weapons of mass destruction === The main allegations were: that Saddam possessed or was attempting to produce WMDs, which he had used in places such as Halabja, possessed, and made efforts to acquire, particularly considering two previous attacks on Baghdad nuclear weapons production facilities by both Iran and Israel which were alleged to have postponed weapons development progress; and, further, that he had ties to terrorists, specifically al-Qaeda.
The Bush administration's overall rationale for the invasion of Iraq was presented in detail by Powell to the UNSC. In summary, he stated,
We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction; he's determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein's history of aggression ... given what we know of his terrorist associations and given his determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not some day use these weapons at a time and the place and in the manner of his choosing at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond? The United States will not and cannot run that risk to the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post–September 11 world. In September 2002, Blair stated that "Regime change in Iraq would be a wonderful thing. That is not the purpose of our action; our purpose is to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction..." In November of that year, Blair further stated that, "So far as our objective, it is disarmament, not regime change – that is our objective. Now I happen to believe the regime of Saddam is a very brutal and repressive regime, I think it does enormous damage to the Iraqi people ... so I have got no doubt Saddam is very bad for Iraq, but on the other hand I have got no doubt either that the purpose of our challenge from the United Nations is the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, it is not regime change." On 31 January 2003, Bush again reiterated that the single trigger for the invasion would be Iraq's failure to disarm, "Saddam Hussein must understand that if he does not disarm, for the sake of peace, we, along with others, will go disarm Saddam Hussein." As late as 25 February, it was still the official line that the only cause of invasion would be a failure to disarm. As Blair made clear in a statement to the House of Commons, "I detest his regime. But even now he can save it by complying with the UN's demand. Even now, we are prepared to go the extra step to achieve disarmament peacefully." In September 2002, the Bush administration said attempts by Iraq to acquire thousands of high-strength aluminum tubes pointed to a clandestine program to make enriched uranium for nuclear bombs. Powell referred to the tubes in his UNSC presentation. A report released by the Institute for Science and International Security in 2002, however, reported that it was highly unlikely that the tubes could be used to enrich uranium. Powell later admitted that his presentation had inaccuracies, based on sourcing that was wrong, and in some cases "deliberately misleading." The Bush administration asserted that the Saddam government had sought to purchase yellowcake uranium from Niger. On 7 March 2003, the U.S. submitted intelligence documents as evidence to the International Atomic Energy Agency. These documents were dismissed by the IAEA as forgeries, with the concurrence in that judgment of outside experts. At the time, an American official stated that the evidence was submitted to the IAEA without knowledge of its provenance and characterized any mistakes as "more likely due to incompetence not malice". Since the invasion, the U.S. government statements concerning Iraqi weapons programs and links to al-Qaeda have been discredited, though chemical weapons were found in Iraq during the occupation period. While the debate of whether Iraq intended to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in the future remains open, no WMDs have been found in Iraq since the invasion despite comprehensive inspections lasting more than 18 months. In Cairo, on 24 February 2001, Powell had predicted as much, saying, "[Saddam] has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbours."
=== Connection to terrorists === Another justification included the alleged connection between Saddam's and that of terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda. While it never made an explicit connection between Iraq and 9/11, the Bush administration repeatedly insinuated a link, thereby creating a false impression for the U.S. public. Grand jury testimony from al-Qaeda's 1993 World Trade Center bombing trials cited numerous direct connections between the bombers to Hussein's government. The Iraqi National Congress alleged that Saddam had been collaborating with al-Qaeda since 1992 via the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS). For example, The Washington Post has noted that,
While not explicitly declaring Iraqi culpability in [9/11], administration officials did, at various times, imply a link. In late 2001, Cheney said it was "pretty well confirmed" that attack mastermind Mohamed Atta had met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official. Later, Cheney called Iraq the "geographic base of the terrorists who had us under assault now for many years, but most especially on 9/11." Steven Kull, director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), observed in March 2003 that the administration "has succeeded in creating a sense that there is some connection" between 9/11 and Saddam. This was after a New York Times/CBS poll showed that 45% of Americans believed Saddam was "personally involved" in the attacks. The Christian Science Monitor observed at the time, while "[s]ources knowledgeable about U.S. intelligence say there is no evidence that Saddam played a role in 9/11, nor that he has been or is currently aiding al-Qaeda. ... the White House appears to be encouraging this false impression, as it seeks to maintain American support for a possible war against Iraq and demonstrate seriousness of purpose to Saddam's regime." The CSM went on to report that, while polling data collected "right after" 9/11 showed that only 3% mentioned Iraq or Saddam, attitudes "had been transformed" by January 2003, with a Knight Ridder poll showing that 44% of Americans believed "most" or "some" of the 9/11 hijackers were Iraqi citizens. The BBC writes that, while Bush "never directly accused the former Iraqi leader of having a hand in" 9/11, he "repeatedly associated the two in keynote addresses" delivered since 9/11, adding that "senior members of his administration have similarly conflated the two." For instance, Powell in February 2003 stated that "We've learned that Iraq has trained al-Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases. And we know that after September 11, Saddam Hussein's regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America." The BBC noted the results of a recent poll which suggested that 70% of Americans believe Saddam "was personally involved" in 9/11. In September 2003, The Boston Globe reported that "Cheney, anxious to defend the White House foreign policy amid ongoing violence in Iraq, stunned intelligence analysts and even members of his own administration this week by failing to dismiss a widely discredited claim: that Saddam Hussein might have played a role" in 9/11. In 2004, U.S. presidential candidate John Kerry alleged that Cheney was continuing "to intentionally mislead the American public" by linking between Saddam and 9/11 "in an attempt to make the invasion of Iraq part of the global war on terror." Since the invasion, assertions of operational links between Iraq and al-Qaeda have largely been discredited by the intelligence community, and Powell himself later admitted he had no proof of it.
=== Iraqi drones === In October 2002, a few days before the U.S. Senate vote on the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, about 75 senators were told in closed session that Iraq had the means of delivering biological and chemical WMDs by unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) drones that could be launched from ships off the U.S.' East Coast to attack cities on the coast. Powell suggested in his 2003 UN presentation that UAVs were transported out of Iraq and could be launched against the U.S. In actuality, Iraq had no offensive UAV fleet or any capability of putting UAVs on ships. Iraq's UAV fleet consisted of less than a handful of outdated Czech training drones. At the time, there was a large dispute within the intelligence community whether the CIA's conclusions about the UAV fleet were accurate. The U.S. Air Force denied outright that Iraq had any offensive UAV capabilities.
=== Human rights === Additional justifications used at various times included Iraqi violation of UN resolutions, the Iraqi government's repression of its citizens, and Iraqi violations of the 1991 ceasefire. As evidence supporting American and British claims about Iraqi WMDs and links to terrorism weakened, some supporters of the invasion have increasingly shifted their justification to the human rights violations of the Saddam government. Leading human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch have argued, however, that they believe human rights concerns were never a central justification for the invasion, nor do they believe that military intervention was justifiable on humanitarian grounds, most significantly because "the killing in Iraq at the time was not of the exceptional nature that would justify such intervention."
Legality of invasion
=== U.S. domestic law === The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 was passed by Congress with Republicans voting 98% in favor in the Senate, and 97% in favor in the House. Democrats supported the joint resolution 58% and 39% in the Senate and House respectively. The resolution asserted the authorization by the U.S. Constitution and Congress for Bush to fight anti-American terrorism. Citing the Iraq Liberation Act, the resolution reiterated that it should be the policy of the U.S. to depose Saddam's government and promote a democratic replacement. The resolution "supported" and "encouraged" diplomatic efforts by Bush to "strictly enforce, through the UN Security Council, all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" and "obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion, and noncompliance, and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq." It authorized Bush to use the U.S. Armed Forces "as he determines to be necessary and appropriate", to "defend [American] national security ... against the continuing threat posed by Iraq".
=== International law === The legality of the invasion of Iraq under international law has been challenged since its inception on a number of fronts, and several prominent supporters of the invasion in all the invading states have publicly and privately cast doubt on its legality. It has been argued by the U.S. and UK that the invasion was fully legal because authorization was implied by the UNSC. International legal experts, including the International Commission of Jurists, a group of 31 leading Canadian law professors, and the U.S.-based Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, have denounced this rationale. On 20 November 2003, The Guardian alleged that Richard Perle, a senior member of the administration's Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, conceded that the invasion was illegal, but still justified. The UNSC passed nearly 60 resolutions on Iraq and Kuwait since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The most relevant to this issue is 1990's Resolution 678, authorizing "member states co-operating with the Government of Kuwait ... to use all necessary means" to (1) implement UNSC Resolution 660 and other resolutions calling for the end of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, and withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory and (2) "restore international peace and security in the area." Resolution 678 has not been rescinded or nullified by succeeding resolutions. and Iraq was not alleged after 1991 to invade Kuwait or to threaten to do so. Resolution 1441 was most prominent during the run-up to the war and formed the main backdrop for Powell's UNSC address. According to an independent commission created the Netherlands, Resolution 1441 "cannot reasonably be interpreted as authorising individual member states to use military force to compel Iraq to comply with the Security Council's resolutions." Accordingly, the Dutch commission concluded that the 2003 invasion violated international law.
At the same time, U.S. officials advanced a parallel legal argument using the earlier resolutions, which authorized force in response to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Under this reasoning, by failing to disarm and submit to weapons inspections, Iraq was in violation of UNSC Resolutions 660 and 678, and the U.S. could legally compel Iraq's compliance through military means. Critics and proponents of the legal rationale based on the UN resolutions argue that the legal right to determine how to enforce its resolutions lies with the UNSC alone, not with individual nations and therefore the invasion of Iraq was not legal under international law, and in direct violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. In 2006, Luis Moreno Ocampo, the lead prosecutor for the International Criminal Court, reported that he had received 240 separate communications regarding the legality of the war, many of which concerned British participation in the invasion. In a letter addressed to the complainants, Moreno Ocampo explained that he could only consider issues related to conduct during the war and not to its underlying legality as a possible crime of aggression because no provision had yet been adopted which "defines the crime and sets out the conditions under which the Court may exercise jurisdiction with respect to it." In 2007, Moreno Ocampo encouraged Iraq to sign up with the court so that it could bring cases related to alleged war crimes. In 2007, U.S. Congressman Dennis Kucinich announced U.S. House Resolution 333 and three articles of impeachment against Cheney. He charged Cheney with manipulating evidence for Iraqi WMDs, deceiving the public about Iraq's connection to al-Qaeda, and threatening aggression against Iran in violation of the UN Charter.
Military aspects
Multilateral support
In November 2002, Bush declared that, "should [Saddam] choose not to disarm, the United States will lead a coalition of the willing to disarm him." Thereafter, the Bush administration briefly used the term coalition of the willing to refer to the countries who supported, militarily or verbally, the military action in Iraq and subsequent military presence in post-invasion Iraq since 2003. The original list prepared in March 2003 included 49 members. Of those 49, only six besides the U.S. contributed troops to the invasion force (the UK, Australia, Poland, Spain, Portugal, and Denmark), and 33 provided some number of troops to support the occupation after the invasion was complete. Six members have no military, meaning that they withheld troops completely.
=== Invasion force === A CENTCOM report indicated that as of 30 April 2003, 466,985 U.S. personnel were deployed for the invasion:
Ground forces: 336,797 Army, 233,342 Army Reserve, 10,683 Army National Guard, 8,866 Marines, 74,405 Marine Reserve, 9,501 Air forces: 64,246 Air Force, 54,955 Air Force Reserve, 2,084 Air National Guard, 7,207 Naval forces: 63,352 Navy, 61,296 Coast Guard: 681 Navy Reserve, 2,056 Approximately 200,194 troops—148,000 American, 50,000 British, 2,000 Australian, and 194 Polish (GROM special forces)—were sent to Kuwait for the invasion. The invasion force was also supported by Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, estimated to number upwards of 70,000. In the latter stages of the invasion, 620 troops of the Iraqi National Congress opposition group were deployed to southern Iraq. Canada discreetly contributed some military resources towards the campaign, such as personnel from the Royal Canadian Air Force who crewed American planes on missions in Iraq to train with the platforms, and eleven Canadian aircrew who manned AWACS aircraft. The Canadian Armed Forces had ships, planes, and 1,200 Royal Canadian Navy personnel at the mouth of the Persian Gulf to help support Operation Enduring Freedom, and a secret U.S. briefing cable noted that despite public promises by Canadian officials that these assets would not be used in support of the war in Iraq, "they will also be available to provide escort services in the Straits and will otherwise be discreetly useful to the military effort." However, the Department of National Defence issued an order to naval commanders to not do anything in support of the American-led operation, and it is not known whether this order was ever broken. Canadian official Eugene Lang stated that it was "quite possible" that Canadian forces indirectly supported the American operation. According to Lang, Canada's military strongly advocated to be involved in the Iraq War instead of the war in Afghanistan, and Canada mainly decided to keep its assets in the Gulf to maintain good relations with America. After the invasion, Canadian Brigadier General Walter Natynczyk served as Deputy Commanding General of the Multi-National Corps in occupied Iraq. Plans to open a second front in the north were severely hampered when Turkey refused the use of its territory for such purposes. In response to Turkey's decision, the U.S. dropped several thousand paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade into northern Iraq, a number significantly less than the 15,000-strong 4th Infantry Division that the U.S. originally planned to deploy to the northern front.
Defending force
The number of personnel in the Iraqi military before the war was uncertain, but it was believed to have been poorly equipped. The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated the numbers: the Iraqi Armed Forces at 389,000 (Ground Forces 350,000, Air Force 20,000, Air Defense 17,000, and Navy 2,000), the paramilitary Fedayeen Saddam at 44,000, Republican Guard at 80,000, and reserves at 650,000. Another estimate numbers the Army at 280,000 to 350,000, the Republican Guard at 50,000 to 80,000, and Fedayeen Saddam at 20,000 and 40,000. There were an estimated thirteen infantry divisions, ten mechanized and armored divisions, as well as some special forces units. The Iraqi Air Force and Navy played a negligible role in the conflict. During the invasion, foreign volunteers traveled to Iraq from Syria and took part in the fighting, usually commanded by the Fedayeen Saddam. It is not known for certain how many foreign fighters fought in Iraq in 2003, however, intelligence officers of the U.S. First Marine Division estimated that 50% of all Iraqi combatants in central Iraq were foreigners. In addition, the Kurdish Islamist militant group Ansar al-Islam controlled a small section of northern Iraq in an area outside Saddam's control. Ansar al-Islam had been fighting against secular Kurdish forces since 2001. At the time of the invasion they fielded about 600 to 800 fighters. Ansar al-Islam was led by the Jordanian-born militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who would later become an important leader in the Iraqi insurgency. Ansar al-Islam was driven out of Iraq in late March by a joint American-Kurdish force during Operation Viking Hammer.
Military equipment
==== Depleted uranium ==== According to information provided to the Dutch Ministry of Defence by American forces, it is estimated that more than 300,000 depleted uranium rounds were fired during the invasion, many in or near populated areas of Iraq, including Samawah, Nasiriyah, and Basra, the vast majority by American forces. In the information, the American forces provided the Dutch Ministry of Defense with the GPS coordinates of the DU rounds, along with a list of targets and numbers fired. Then, the Dutch Ministry of Defence released the data to Dutch peace group Pax under the Freedom of Information Act.
==== Cluster munitions ==== Coalition forces used 61,000 cluster munitions containing 20 million submunitions during the Gulf War, and 13,000 cluster munitions containing two million submunitions during the 2003 invasion and subsequent insurgency. Thousands of unexploded munitions from the invasion and previous wars, including cluster munitions, mines and other unexploded ordnance, still posed a threat to civilians as of 2022.
Military preparations
==== Special operations forces ==== CIA Special Activities Division (SAD) and MI6 (E Squadron) paramilitary teams entered Iraq in July 2002 before the 2003 invasion. Once on the ground they prepared for the subsequent arrival of American and British military forces. SAD teams then combined with U.S. Army Special Forces to organize the Kurdish Peshmerga. This joint team combined to defeat Ansar al-Islam, an ally of Al Qaeda, in a battle in the northeast corner of Iraq. A chemical weapons facility at Sargat was also captured. Sargat was the only facility of its type discovered in the Iraq war. The U.S. side was carried out by Paramilitary Officers from SAD and the Army's 10th Special Forces Group. SAD teams also conducted high-risk special reconnaissance missions behind Iraqi lines to identify senior leadership targets. These missions led to the initial strikes against Saddam Hussein and his key generals. Although the initial strikes against Saddam were unsuccessful in killing the dictator or his generals, they were successful in effectively ending the ability to command and control Iraqi forces. Other strikes against key generals were successful and significantly degraded the command's ability to react to and maneuver against the U.S.-led invasion force coming from the south. SAD operations officers were also successful in convincing key Iraqi army officers to surrender their units once the fighting started or not to oppose the invasion force. NATO member Turkey refused to allow its territory to be used for the invasion. As a result, the SAD/SOG and U.S. Army Special Forces joint teams and the Kurdish Peshmerga constituted the entire northern force against government forces during the invasion. Their efforts kept the 5th Corps of the Iraqi army in place to defend against the Kurds rather than moving to contest the coalition force in the south. Four of these CIA officers were awarded the Intelligence Star for their actions. MI6 conducted Operation Mass Appeal which was a campaign to plant stories about Iraq's WMDs in the media and boost support for the invasion. MI6 also went on to bribe many of Saddam's closest allies to turn over information and intelligence. According to Tommy Franks, "April Fool", an American officer working undercover as a diplomat, was approached by an Iraqi intelligence agent. April Fool then sold the Iraqi false "top secret" invasion plans provided by Franks' team. This deception misled the Iraqi military into deploying major forces in northern and western Iraq in anticipation of attacks by way of Turkey or Jordan, which never took place. This greatly reduced the defensive capacity in the rest of Iraq, and facilitated the actual attacks via Kuwait and the Persian Gulf in the southeast.
