Convoy PQ 16 (21–30 May 1942) was an Arctic convoy of British, United States and Allied ships from Iceland to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk in the Soviet Union during the Second World War. The convoy was the largest yet and was provided with a considerable number of escorts and submarines. Convoy QP 12, a return convoy, sailed on the same day. As Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, had failed in 1941, the Germans began to build up forces in Norway to intercept Arctic convoys with ships, aircraft and U-boats, rather than rely on a quick victory. Luftflotte 5 (Air Fleet 5), the Luftwaffe force in Norway, was reinforced with bombers and torpedo-bombers in early 1942 and reorganised to attack convoys as they passed between the Norwegian coast and the ice of the Arctic, which was still close to its southern winter limit. The sun remained above the horizon at this time of year and the deck crews of the ships found the perpetual daylight fatiguing and stressful; glare from ice being particularly difficult for observers. On 25 May air attacks began, the German bombers and torpedo-bombers co-ordinating their attacks. Torpedo-bombers launched at the same time in the Golden comb tactic to make it harder for ships to evade the torpedoes. The air attacks continued until 1 June and sank six ships, one other being lost to a U-boat; 3–6 German aircraft were shot down and one damaged; on 27 May 108 attacks by aircraft were counted. After the convoy, the escort commander recommended that convoys be given far more anti-aircraft firepower and air cover from an escort carrier. The Germans claimed the virtual destruction of the convoy and concluded that air operations were more effective than submarine attacks in the long hours of daylight. The Golden comb tactic of combined dive-bombing and torpedo-bombing, with the torpedoes being dropped in a salvo, was vindicated.
Background
Lend-lease
After Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the USSR, began on 22 June 1941, the UK and USSR signed an agreement in July that they would "render each other assistance and support of all kinds in the present war against Hitlerite Germany". Before September 1941 the British had dispatched 450 aircraft, 22,000 long tons (22,000 t) of rubber, 3,000,000 pairs of boots and stocks of tin, aluminium, jute, lead and wool. In September British and United States representatives travelled to Moscow to study Soviet requirements and their ability to meet them. The representatives of the three countries drew up a protocol in October 1941 to last until June 1942 and to agree new protocols to operate from 1 July to 30 June of each following year until the end of Lend-Lease. The protocol listed supplies, monthly rates of delivery and totals for the period. The first protocol specified the supplies to be sent but not the ships to move them. The USSR turned out to lack the ships and escorts and the British and Americans, who had made a commitment to "help with the delivery", undertook to deliver the supplies for want of an alternative. The main Soviet need in 1941 was military equipment to replace losses because, at the time of the negotiations, two large aircraft factories were being moved east from Leningrad and two more from Ukraine. It would take at least eight months to resume production, until when, aircraft output would fall from 80 to 30 aircraft per day. Britain and the US undertook to send 400 aircraft a month, at a ratio of three bombers to one fighter (later reversed), 500 tanks a month and 300 Bren gun carriers. The Anglo-Americans also undertook to send 42,000 long tons (43,000 t) of aluminium and 3, 862 machine tools, along with sundry raw materials, food and medical supplies.
Arctic Ocean
Between Greenland and Norway are some of the most stormy waters of the world's oceans, 890 mi (1,440 km) of water under gales full of snow, sleet and hail. Around the North Cape and the Barents Sea the sea temperature rarely rises about 4° Celsius and a man in the water would probably die unless rescued immediately. The cold water and air made spray freeze on the superstructure of ships, which had to be removed quickly to avoid the ship becoming top-heavy. The cold Arctic water was met by the Gulf Stream, warm water from the Gulf of Mexico, which became the North Atlantic Drift, arriving at the south-west of England the drift moves between Scotland and Iceland. North of Norway the drift splits. A northern stream goes north of Bear Island to Svalbard and the southern stream following the coast of Murmansk into the Barents Sea. The mingling of cold Arctic water and warmer water of higher salinity generates thick banks of fog for convoys to hide in but the waters drastically reduced the effectiveness of ASDIC as U-boats moved in waters of differing temperatures and density. In winter, polar ice can form as far south as 50 mi (80 km) of the North Cape and in summer it can recede to Svalbard, forcing ships closer to Luftwaffe air bases or being able to sail further out to sea. The area is in perpetual darkness in winter and permanent daylight in the summer which makes air reconnaissance almost impossible or easy.
Arctic convoys
In October 1941, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, made a commitment to send a convoy to the Arctic ports of the USSR every ten days and to deliver 1,200 tanks a month from July 1942 to January 1943, followed by 2,000 tanks and another 3,600 aircraft in excess of those already promised. The first convoy was due at Murmansk around 12 October and the next convoy was to depart Iceland on 22 October. A motley of British, Allied and neutral shipping loaded with military stores and raw materials for the Soviet war effort would be assembled at Hvalfjörður in Iceland, convenient for ships from both sides of the Atlantic. By late 1941, the convoy system used in the Atlantic had been established on the Arctic run; a convoy commodore ensured that the ships' masters and signals officers attended a briefing to make arrangements for the management of the convoy, which sailed in a formation of long rows of short columns. The commodore was usually a retired naval officer or a Royal Naval Reserveist and would be aboard one of the merchant ships (identified by a white pendant with a blue cross). The commodore was assisted by a Naval signals party of four men, who used lamps, semaphore flags and telescopes to pass signals in code. In large convoys, the commodore was assisted by vice- and rear-commodores with whom he directed the speed, course and zig-zagging of the merchant ships and liaised with the escort commander. During the summer months, convoys went as far north as 75 N latitude then south into the Barents Sea and to the ports of Murmansk in the Kola Inlet and Arkhangelsk in the White Sea. In winter, due to the polar ice expanding southwards, the convoy route ran closer to Norway. Until early March 1942 one merchant ship of the 110 sent via the Arctic route had been lost; the condition of the receiving ports in the USSR caused more difficulty than German anti-convoy operations by ships, submarines and aircraft. As the summer season approached the hours of daylight increased just as the size of convoys got bigger to alleviate the accumulation of ships awaiting dispatch.
=== British grand strategy === The growing German air strength in Norway and increasing losses to convoys and their escorts, particularly to convoys Convoy PQ 15 and Convoy QP 11, led Rear-Admiral Stuart Bonham Carter, commander of the 18th Cruiser Squadron, Admiral Sir John Tovey, Commander in Chief Home Fleet and Admiral Sir Dudley Pound the First Sea Lord, the professional head of the Royal Navy, unanimously to advocate the suspension of Arctic convoys during the summer months. The small number of Russian ships available for Arctic convoys, losses inflicted by Luftflotte 5 based in Norway and the presence of the German battleship Tirpitz in Norway from early 1942, had led to a large number of ships full of supplies to Russia becoming stranded at the west end and empty and damaged ships waiting at the east end. The loss of Trinidad in 14 May, concentrated minds in the British government and Admiralty about the feasibility of convoys during the summer months. With the loss of HMS Fiji during the Battle of Crete in 1941, it was clear that even fast, manoeuvrable and well-armed warships were doomed, in waters where the Germans had air supremacy. Churchill wrote to Stalin that they had been lucky with Convoy PQ 15 and that the decision to sail Convoy PQ 16 with 35 ships. It was important that the Soviet air force made a maximum effort against Luftwaffe airfields in northern Norway. Stalin replied that 20 bombers had been transferred to the north for attacks on German airfields and that with the navy the VVS "would do the utmost". Despite the views of the Navy, pressure from the president of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, led to Churchill to bow to political reality,
The operation is justified if half gets through. Failure on our part to make the attempt would weaken our influence with both our major allies. and ordered on 20 May the dispatch of the convoy.
Signals intelligence
Bletchley Park
The British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based at Bletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers and traffic analysts. By June 1941, the German Enigma machine Home Waters (Heimish) settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed but German ships and the U-boats in Arctic waters continued with the older Heimish (Hydra from 1942, Dolphin to the British). By mid-1941, British Y-stations were able to read Luftwaffe W/T transmissions and give advance warning of Luftwaffe operations. In 1941, naval Headache personnel with receivers to eavesdrop on Luftwaffe wireless transmissions were embarked on warships and from May 1942, ships gained RAF Y computor (sic) parties, which sailed with cruiser admirals in command of convoy escorts, to interpret Luftwaffe W/T signals intercepted by the Headaches. The Admiralty sent details of Luftwaffe wireless frequencies, call signs and the daily local codes to the computors, which combined with their knowledge of Luftwaffe procedures, could glean fairly accurate details of German reconnaissance sorties. Sometimes computors predicted attacks twenty minutes before they were detected by radar.
B-Dienst
The rival German Beobachtungsdienst (B-Dienst, Observation Service) of the Kriegsmarine Marinenachrichtendienst (MND, Naval Intelligence Service) had broken several Admiralty codes and cyphers by 1939, which were used to help Kriegsmarine ships elude British forces and provide opportunities for surprise attacks. From June to August 1940, six British submarines were sunk in the Skaggerak using information gleaned from British wireless signals. In 1941, B-Dienst read signals from the Commander in Chief Western Approaches informing convoys of areas patrolled by U-boats, enabling the submarines to move into "safe" zones. B-Dienst had broken Naval Cypher No 3 in February 1942 and by March was reading up to 80 per cent of the traffic, which continued until 15 December 1943. By coincidence, the British lost access to the Shark cypher and had no information to send in Cypher No 3 which might compromise Ultra. In early September, Finnish Radio Intelligence deciphered a Soviet Air Force transmission which divulged the convoy itinerary and forwarded it to the Germans.
Prelude
Luftflotte 5
In March 1942, Adolf Hitler issued a directive for a greater anti-convoy effort to weaken the Red Army and prevent Allied troops from being transferred to northern Russia, preparatory to a landing on the coast of northern Norway. Luftflotte 5 (Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen Stumpff) was to be reinforced and the Kriegsmarine was ordered to put an end to Arctic convoys and naval incursions. The Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine were to work together with a simplified command structure, which was implemented after a conference; the Navy had preferred joint command but the Luftwaffe insisted on the exchange of liaison officers. Luftflotte 5 was to be reinforced by 2./Kampfgeschwader 30 (KG 30) and KG 30 was to increase its readiness for operations. A squadron of Aufklärungsflieger Gruppe 125 (Aufkl.Fl.Gr. 125) was transferred to Norway and more long-range Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Kondor patrol aircraft from Kampfgeschwader 40 (KG 40) were sent from France. At the end of March, the air fleet was divided. Fliegerführer Nord (Ost) [Oberst Alexander Holle], the largest command, was based at Kirkenes with 2./JG 5, 10.(Z)/JG 5, 1./StG 5 (Dive Bomber Wing 5) and 1.Fernaufklärungsgruppe 124 [1./(F) 124] (1 Squadron, Long Range Reconnaissance Wing 124) charged with attacks on Murmansk and Arkhangelsk as well as attacks on convoys. Part of Fliegerführer Nord (Ost) was based at Petsamo (5./JG 5, 6./JG 5 and 3./Kampfgeschwader 26 (3./KG 26), Banak (2./KG 30, 3./KG 30 and 1./(F) 22) and Billefjord (1./Kü.Fl.Gr. 125). Fliegerführer Lofoten (Oberst Hans Roth) was based at Bardufoss but had no permanently attached units, which were added according to events. At the start of the anti-shipping campaign only the coastal patrol squadrons 3./Küstenfliegergruppe 906 at Trondheim and 1./1./Kü.Fl.Gr. 123 at Tromsø were attached to Fliegerführer Lofoten. Fliegerführer Nord (West) was based at Sola and was responsible for the early detection of convoys and attacks south of a line from Trondheim westwards to Shetland and Iceland, with 1./(F) 22, the Kondors of 1./KG 40, short-range coastal reconnaissance squadrons 1./Küstenfliegergruppe 406 (1./Kü.Fl.Gr. 406), 2./ Küstenfliegergruppe 406 (2./Kü.Fl.Gr. 406) and a weather reconnaissance squadron.
Luftwaffe tactics
As soon as information was received about the assembly of a convoy, Fliegerführer Nord (West) would send long-range reconnaissance aircraft to search Iceland and northern Scotland. Once a convoy was spotted, aircraft were to keep contact as far as possible in the extreme weather of the area. If contact was lost its course at the last sighting would be extrapolated and overlapping sorties would be flown to regain contact. All three Fliegerführer were to co-operate as the convoy moved through their operational areas. Fliegerführer Lofoten would begin the anti-convoy operation east to a line from the North Cape to Spitzbergen Island, whence Fliegerführer Nord (Ost) would take over using his and the aircraft of Fliegerführer Lofoten that would fly to Kirkenes or Petsamo to stay in range; Fliegerführer Nord (Ost) was not allowed to divert aircraft to ground support during the operation. As soon as the convoy came into range, the aircraft were to keep up a continuous attack until the convoy docked at Murmansk or Arkhangelsk. From late March to late May the air effort against Convoy PQ 13, Convoy PQ 14, Convoy PQ 15, Convoy QP 9, Convoy QP 10 and Convoy QP 11 had little effect, twelve sinkings out of 16 ships lost in QP convoys and two ships out of five sinkings from QP convoys being ascribed to the Luftwaffe; 166 merchant ships had sailed for Russia and 145 had survived the journey. Bad weather had been nearly as dangerous as the Luftwaffe, forcing 16 of the ships in Convoy PQ 14 to turn back. In April, the spring thaw grounded many Luftwaffe aircraft and in May bad weather led to contact being lost and convoys scattering, being impossible to find in the long Arctic night. When air attacks on convoys had taken place, the formations rarely amounted to more than twelve aircraft, greatly simplifying the task of convoy anti-aircraft gunners, who shot down several aircraft in April and May. Failings in liaison between the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine were uncovered and tactical co-operation greatly enhanced, Hermann Böhm (Kommandierender Admiral Norwegen) noting that in the operation against Convoy PQ 15 and Convoy QP 11, co-operation between aircraft, submarines and destroyers had been excellent. From 152 aircraft in January, reinforcements to Luftflotte 5 increased its strength to 221 front-line aircraft by March 1942. By May Luftflotte 5 had 264 aircraft based around the North Cape in northern Norway, consisting of 108 Ju 88 long-range bombers, 42 Heinkel 111 torpedo-bombers, 15 Heinkel He 115 float-plane torpedo-bombers, 30 Junkers Ju 87 dive-bombers and 74 long range Focke Wulf 200s, Junkers 88s and Blohm & Voss BV 138s.
German air-sea rescue
The Sea Rescue Service (Seenotdienst) along with the Kriegsmarine, the Norwegian Society for Sea Rescue (RS) and ships on passage, recovered aircrew and shipwrecked sailors. The service comprised Seenotbereich VIII at Stavanger covering Stavanger, Bergen and Trondheim and Seenotbereich IX at Kirkenes for Tromsø, Billefjord and Kirkenes. Co-operation was as important in rescues as it was in anti-shipping operations if people were to be saved before they succumbed to the climate and severe weather. The sea rescue aircraft comprised Heinkel He 59 floatplanes, Dornier Do 18 and Dornier Do 24 seaplanes. Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL, the high command of the Luftwaffe) was not able to increase the number of search and rescue aircraft in Norway, due to a general shortage of aircraft and crews, despite Stumpff pointing out that coming down in such cold waters required extremely swift recovery and that his crews "must be given a chance of rescue" or morale could not be maintained. After the experience of Convoy PQ 16, Stumpff gave the task to the coastal reconnaissance squadrons, whose aircraft were not usually engaged in attacks on convoys. They would henceforth stand by to rescue aircrew during anti-shipping operations.
Strategic assessments
German
On 12 May, SKL judged that the British and Americans were well aware of the importance of shipments to the Soviet Union, when the second German attempt to knock the USSR out of the war was due. Intelligence reports referred to much bigger convoys, along with raids and a landing in northern Norway to stop the German forces there from intervening, raids being the more likely threat. From the start of May the big ships that could sortie against a convoy comprised the battleship Tirpitz, the heavy cruisers Admiral Scheer and Admiral Hipper with six destroyers and six torpedo boats (small destroyers). The heavy cruiser Lützow was due at Trondheim in mid-May and the last ten destroyers of the Kriegsmarine would be ready for Norway in June. On 9 May, Admiral Scheer transferred from Trondheim to Narvik, closer to the convoy route, as did Schmundt with Z34 and Z35 to be followed by Lützow and another two destroyers.
As SKL prepared to for more ambitious use of its ships, the tactical limits it imposed, led to some bemusement amongst the senior officers. Less was expected the U-boat force, because night attacks, so successful in the Atlantic, were impossible in the long daylight hours of the midnight sun when it was difficult to stalk convoys and to evade attacks from escorts liable to emerge suddenly from patches of fog and rain. Until August, SKL anticipated only "minor and purely accidental" success and so it would be futile to reinforce the Artic U-boats. As usual, Rear-Admiral Karl Dönitz, the Befehlshaber der U-Boote, wanted the U-boats back in the Atlantic and equally predictably, SKL took the view that even rare sinkings were worth the diversion of U-boats to the Arctic. In the ten months to the end of April 1942, 32 U-boats operated in the Arctic, when 27 Arctic convoys of 309 ships had been run and two U-boats sunk for the loss of six ships. In north American waters, from January 1942, 25 boats had sunk 336 ships of 1.8 million GRT.
==== British ==== On 29 April, Oliver Lyttleton, the Minister of Production since 12 March, presented a review of the Arctic convoys. The review concluded that the Soviet Union would face the main German effort of 1942 and that Britain must guard against the USSR making a separate peace by making a maximum effort to deliver military equipment. Britain must choose between a Second Front in 1942 or send as much assistance to the Soviet Union, even if this was detrimental to the war economy. Britain should sent its most potent weapons and ensure that the were delivered before the German summer offensive began, that a diminution of deliveries could affect the morale of the industrial workforce in Britain. The last conclusion was that the only way to get British-made tanks into action was through the Red Army (ignoring North Africa and the Far East) and that more tanks mattered more than more aircraft. The document was rare in its emphasis the relationship between operations on the continent and support for Russia. Despite the significance of this point, discussion concentrated on whether to cut First Protocol April and May aircraft exports by 40% and how to sent 50% more tanks and aircraft for the first half of the Second Protocol, due to begin on 1 July. Aircraft deliveries were already 136 short but crises in North Africa and the Far East could not be ignored. The danger of the looming second German attempt to defeat the USSR meant that it was most important that the First Protocol be met. The Air Ministry should meet the shortage by other means than cutting the supply of aircraft to Russia and Lyttleton thought that British tank production would fund a 50% increase in exports to the USSR and that this would placate the Russians for not increasing the number aircraft supplied but a decision was postponed. The Second Protocol (1 July 1942 to 1 July 1943) requirements from the Russians were for about 10.5 million tons of supplies, with 8.3 million tons coming from the US. The American authorities calculated that the Russians could only import about 3 million tons in Arctic convoys. The Admiralty considered that no more than 25 ships could be escorted in one convoy and that only three convoys could be run in eight weeks. Even if some British commitments could be met by the US the British would need 10% more ships and that the prospect for a big increase in Arctic deliveries above the 320,000 tons delivered offered no certainty that Soviet port facilities could handle three million tons. Ships had been carrying an average of 3,000 tons and US assumptions were based on double this and the burden of protecting Arctic and Persian Gulf convoys carrying mainly US supplies would fall on the Royal Navy, against the increasing intensity of German counter-operations, Arctic convoys had three times the number of anti-submarine escorts than comparable Atlantic convoys. The loss of Trinidad concentrated minds in the British government and Admiralty about the feasibility of convoys during the summer months. With the loss of HMS Fiji during the Battle of Crete in 1941, it was clear that even fast, manoeuvrable and well-armed warships were doomed, in waters where the Germans had air supremacy.
==== Soviet ==== Josef Stalin was influenced by reports from Admiral Arseny Golovko and the Soviet Naval Command that inflated the achievements of the Navy in the far north, Golovko claiming that in the first year of the war, 135 ships of 583,000 GRT had been sunk and 412 aircraft shot down. The real figures were 28 ships of around 40,000 GRT; two U-boats being sunk before the end of the war, of 44 U-boats sunk in the Arctic, 38 were due to the British. About ten per cent of the claim for aircraft was realistic, Luftflotte V not having anything like that many aircraft until mid-1942. On 5 May, Rear-Admiral Geoffrey Miles, the leader of the British Military Mission to Russia, reported that Soviet naval personnel were young, disciplined and determined fighters but had no naval tradition and a top-down command structure that stifled initiative and sneered at advice from Allied navies. During operations spectaculars were preferred to useful sailing, convoy escort being looked down on. Seamanship and navigation were poor and naval weapons were only effective in good weather. Ships spent too much time in harbour and destroyers neglected to refuel on return to base, readiness being a matter of little interest.
=== Cruiser and distant escorts === After a naval action on 2 May, the Admiralty judged that the threat from German destroyers had declined and that cruisers need not escort Convoy PQ 16 beyond Bear Island. HMS Nigeria (Admiral Harold Burrough, commander cruiser covering force) and its destroyers HMS Oribi, Onslow and Marne departed from Seidisfiord on 23 May with the escorting destroyers for Convoy PQ 16, ORP Garland, HMS Volunteer, Achates, Ashanti and Martin. The heavy cruisers HMS Kent, Norfolk and the light cruiser Liverpool arrived later from Hvalfjörður on the west coast of Iceland. The Admiralty anticipated that the main threat to Convoy PQ 16/Convoy QP 12 were Admiral Scheer which was at Narvik by 10 May and the heavy cruiser Lützow which arrived on 26 May, the oiler (Troßschiff) Dithmarschen, the destroyer Z10 Hans Lody and the torpedo boat T7. To guard against a sortie by the battleship Tirpitz, the aircraft carrier Victorious, the battleships HMS Duke of York (Admiral John Tovey, commander distant covering force) and USS Washington, the heavy cruisers USS Wichita and HMS London with nine British and four US fleet destroyers were to patrol to the north-east of Iceland. Five British and three Soviet submarines were to patrol off Norway and the Russians promised to attack Luftwaffe airfields in northern Norway with 200 bombers of the Soviet Air Forces (Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily, VVS). (The Russians could only provide 20 bombers for an attack after the main German operation against the convoy had ended.)
Convoy escorts
The 36 ships of Convoy PQ 16 (Convoy Commodore Newell Gale RNR) the largest Arctic convoy yet, sailed from Hvalfjörður in Iceland on 21 May 1942; the departure was reported by a German spy in Reykjavík. Convoys had a standard formation of short columns, number 1 to the left in the direction of travel. Each position in the column was numbered; 11 was the first ship in column 1 and 12 was the second ship in the column; 21 was the first ship in column 2. Ships in column sailed at intervals of 400 yd (370 m) until 1943, when the interval was increased to 600 yd (550 m) and then 800 yd (730 m) to cater for inexperienced captains reluctant to keep so close. The convoy formed nine columns with a close escort of the minesweeper HMS Hazard and the naval trawlers St Elstan, Lady Madeleine, Northern Spray and the Free French Retriever, which had to return after three days, being too slow to keep up. The merchant ship SS Empire Lawrence a catapult aircraft merchant ship that carried a Hawker Hurricane fighter for air defence. On 23 May, HMS Alynbank, an auxiliary anti-aircraft cruiser, joined the convoy from Seyðisfjörður (Seidisfiord). A converted steamer, Alynbank was equipped with radar, four pairs of high-angle 4-inch guns with director control, two quadruple QF 2-pounder Mark VIII "pom-pom" guns and 20 mm Oerlikon guns with a Royal Navy crew and acting-captain Henry Nash in command. Alynbank was accompanied by the corvettes Honeysuckle, Starwort, Hyderabad and the Free French Roselys. The T-class submarine HMS Trident and the S-class submarine Seawolf joined the convoy, as did Force Q, the fleet oiler RFA Black Ranger and the Hunt-class destroyer HMS Ledbury. The Allied submarines P37, P46, P614, the Netherlands O-10, the Free French Minerve and the Soviet submarines S-102, Shch-422 and K-1 formed a flanking screen.
Convoy
24 May
The cruiser covering force was spotted by a German reconnaissance aircraft at 7:00 p.m. on 24 May and at midnight ran into a thick fog. The cruisers and the destroyers Ashanti, Martin, Achates, Volunteer and Garland turned north-east to avoid collisions; in the murk, the destroyers separated for safety. Garland lost station and rejoined the cruisers as the other destroyers searched for the convoy. Convoy PQ 16 was having difficulties of its own and only avoided dispersal because of the radar carried by the escorts, the sets on Volunteer and Hyderabad in particular. The merchant ships moved through the fog sounding "course 080°, speed 6 kn" in Morse code on their sirens but the convoy was not able to regain formation until the evening. Inside the Arctic Circle there is perpetual daylight from May to July and patchy fog continued to hamper the crews, exhausting lookouts and watch-keepers. At about 5:00 a.m. the visibility improved and the cruisers joined the convoy in pairs between the central columns of the freighters. The 17th Destroyer Flotilla in Onslow placed his ships at the disposal of Commander Richard Onslow, the Captain (D) in Ashanti, the close escort commander.
25 May
Ashanti had embarked a party of RAF airmen who spoke German and had high-frequency wireless receivers to eavesdrop on Luftwaffe R/T traffic. Sometimes the RAF men heard pilots on the ground talking to each other and later listened to their claims as they returned to their airfields. An FW 200 Kondor appeared at 6:00 a.m. and was fired on by a destroyer as the convoy zig-zagged. More fog was encountered and the zig-zagging was stopped and started again in the clear patches. The destroyers took on fuel from Black Ranger and then Force Q left the convoy. Convoy QP 12 crossed at about 2:00 p.m. and reported sighting a U-boat at 1:00 p.m.; at 3:00 p.m., Martin, on the starboard side of the convoy, spotted a U-boat and attacked, firing until the submarine dived, then depth-charged the area before returning to its station. The convoy sailed eastwards in a moderate sea breeze but the endless daylight continued to affect the crews above decks, making them more tense and fatigued. A BV 138 took over the shadowing from the Kondor and the first air attack began at 7:10 p.m. Several Ju 88s and 9 Heinkel 111 torpedo-bombers from 3./KG 26 (Hauptmann Eicke), six of which turned back due to the clear sky. The remaining Heinkels 111s attacked out of the sun and claimed one ship sunk and one damaged. Empire Lawrence launched Pilot Officer May in its catapult Hurricane, who attacked the Heinkel 111s. May set one on fire and damaged another; he was wounded in the legs by return fire and his Hurricane was hit by anti-aircraft fire from one of the ships. Hay ditched his Hurricane in the path of the convoy, where he was picked up by Volunteer. The Heinkels dropped torpedoes, all of which missed and six Junkers Ju 88s dive-bombed. Hyderabad was near-missed and the US merchantman Carlton suffered a broken steam pipe. The anti-submarine trawler Northern Spray took Carlton in tow and turned back to Iceland, the pair arriving safely. Six He 111s of 2./KG 26 and four He 115s of 1./Kü.Fl.Gr. 406 arrived later. British observers noticed that one of the He 115s circled after attacking, thought to be ready to rescue shot-down aircrew. The He 111s claimed one possible hit and five misses, the He 115s claimed one torpedo launched and three aircraft turning back due to the visibility.
26 May
Low cloud grounded the bombers until just before midnight; 20 Ju 88s of III./KG 30 and seven He 111 torpedo-bombers of 3./KG 26 attacked the convoy with no result for the loss of two aircraft to anti-aircraft fire from the convoy and escorts. The He 111s claimed three ships hit and three damaged; fifteen of the Ju 88s reported failure to find the convoy and of the five which did, none reported a hit. The convoy encountered drifting ice and in the conditions U-boat wolfpack was evaded but Asdic contacts were gained around 3:00 a.m. and depth-charged. At 3:05 a.m. Syros at the back of the seventh column was torpedoed by U-703 and nine of the crew were killed; the survivors were rescued by Haggard and Lady Madeleine. As the escorts depth-charged, Burroughs took the cruiser covering force and its destroyers to the north at 20 kn (37 km/h; 23 mph) to join Convoy QP 12. The anti-aircraft firepower of the force had been of great value and the departure was viewed as desertion by the merchant ship crews, especially the US and Soviet personnel. Torpedoes from U-436 and U-591 missed one of the merchant ships and Ashanti; U-boat sightings and attacks on them by the escorts occurred for the rest of the day. Shadowing aircraft remained in contact all day; at 6:00 p.m. seven He 111 torpedo-bombers of KG 26 and eleven Ju 88s of KG 30 attacked and were driven off by the anti-aircraft fire of the convoy and escorts. During the evening, 100 nmi (190 km; 120 mi) west of Bear Island, the convoy made a turn to the south-east, almost direct towards Banak, because of pack-ice.
