The East African campaign (also known as the Abyssinian campaign) was a military campaign fought in East Africa during the Second World War by the Allies of World War II, mainly from the British Empire, against Italy and its colony of Italian East Africa, between June 1940 and November 1941. The British Middle East Command with troops from the United Kingdom, South Africa, British India, Uganda Protectorate, Kenya, Somaliland, West Africa, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Sudan and Nyasaland participated in the campaign. These were joined by the Allied Force Publique of Belgian Congo, Imperial Ethiopian Arbegnoch (resistance forces) and a small unit of Free French Forces. Italian East Africa was defended by the Comando Forze Armate dell'Africa Orientale Italiana (Italian East African Armed Forces Command), with units from the Regio Esercito (Royal Army), Regia Aeronautica (Royal Air Force) and Regia Marina (Royal Navy). The Italian forces included about 250,000 soldiers of the Regio Corpo Truppe Coloniali (Royal Corps of Colonial Troops), led by Italian officers and NCOs. With Britain in control of the Suez Canal, the Italian forces were cut off from supplies and reinforcement once hostilities began. On 13 June 1940, an Italian air raid took place on the RAF base at Wajir in Kenya and the air war continued until Italian forces had been pushed back from Kenya and Sudan, through Somaliland, Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1940 and early 1941. The remnants of the Italian forces in the region surrendered after the Battle of Gondar in November 1941, except for small groups that fought a guerrilla war in Ethiopia against the British until the Armistice of Cassibile in September 1943, which ended the war between Italy and the Allies. The East African campaign was the first Allied strategic victory in the war; few Italian forces escaped the region to be used in other campaigns and the Italian defeat greatly eased the flow of supplies through the Red Sea to Egypt. Most of the Commonwealth forces were transferred to North Africa to participate in the Western Desert campaign.
Background
Italian East Africa
On 9 May 1936, the Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini, proclaimed the formation of Italian East Africa (Africa Orientale Italiana, AOI), from Ethiopia after the Second Italo-Abyssinian War and the colonies of Italian Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. On 10 June 1940, Mussolini declared war on Britain and France, which made Italian military forces in Libya a threat to Egypt and those in the AOI a danger to the British and French colonies in East Africa. Italian belligerence also closed the Mediterranean to Allied merchant ships and endangered British sea lanes along the coast of East Africa, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. (The Kingdom of Egypt remained neutral during the Second World War but the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 allowed the British to occupy Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.) Egypt, the Suez Canal, French Somaliland and British Somaliland were also vulnerable to invasion but the Italian General Staff had planned for a war after 1942; in the summer of 1940 Italy was far from ready for a long war or for the occupation of large areas of Africa.
Regio Esercito
Amedeo, Duke of Aosta, was appointed Viceroy and Governor-General of the AOI in November 1937, with a headquarters in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital. On 1 June 1940, as the commander in chief of Comando Forze Armate dell'Africa Orientale Italiana (Italian East African Armed Forces Command) and Generale d'Armata Aerea (General of the Air Force), Aosta had about 290,476 local and metropolitan troops (including naval and air force personnel). By 1 August, mobilisation had increased the number to 371,053 troops. On 10 June, the Italian army was organised in three corps and one division commands,
Northern Sector, in Asmara, Lieutenant General Luigi Frusci (Italian Eritrea) Southern Sector, in Jimma, General Pietro Gazzera Eastern Sector, in Addis Ababa, General Guglielmo Nasi Giuba Sector, in Mogadishu, Lieutenant General Carlo De Simone (Southern Italian Somaliland) Aosta had two metropolitan divisions, the 40th Infantry Division "Cacciatori d'Africa" and the 65th Infantry Division "Granatieri di Savoia", the Alpini Battalion "Uork Amba" of the 7th Alpini Regiment Alpini (elite mountain troops), a Bersaglieri battalion of motorised infantry, several Blackshirt Milizia Coloniale battalions and smaller units. About 70 per cent of Italian troops were locally recruited Askari. The regular Eritrean battalions and the Regio Corpo Truppe Coloniali (RCTC Royal Corps of Somali Colonial Troops) were among the best Italian units in the AOI and included Eritrean cavalry Penne di Falco (Falcon Feathers). (On one occasion a squadron of horse charged British and Commonwealth troops, throwing small hand grenades from the saddle.) Most colonial troops were recruited, trained and equipped for colonial repression, although the Somali Dubats from the borderlands were useful light infantry and skirmishers. Irregular bande were hardy and mobile, knew the country and were effective scouts and saboteurs, although sometimes confused with Shifta, marauders who plundered and murdered at will. Once Italy entered the war, a 100-strong company was formed from German residents of East Africa and stranded German sailors. Italian forces in East Africa were equipped with about 3,313 heavy machine-guns, 5,313 machine-guns, 24 M11/39 medium tanks, 39 L3/35 tankettes, 126 armoured cars and 824 guns, twenty-four 20 mm anti-aircraft guns, seventy-one 81 mm mortars and 672,800 rifles. The Italians had little opportunity for reinforcement or supply, leading to severe shortages, especially of ammunition. On occasion, foreign merchant vessels captured by German merchant raiders in the Indian Ocean were brought to Somali ports but their cargoes were not always of much use to the Italian war effort. On 22 November 1940 the Yugoslav steamer Durmitor, captured by the German auxiliary cruiser Atlantis, put in at Warsheikh with a cargo of salt and several hundred prisoners.
Regia Aeronautica
The Comando Aeronautica Africa Orientale Italiana (CAAOI) of the Regia Aeronautica (General Pietro Pinna) based in Addis Ababa, had three sector commands corresponding to the land fronts,
Comando Settore Aeronautico Nord (Air Sector Headquarters North) Comando Settore Aeronautico Est (Air Sector Headquarters West) Comando Settore Aeronautico Sud (Air Sector Headquarters South) In June 1940, there were 323 aircraft in the AOI, in 23 bomber squadrons with 138 aircraft, comprising 14 squadrons with six aircraft each, six Caproni Ca.133 light bomber squadrons, seven Savoia-Marchetti SM.81 squadrons and two squadrons of Savoia-Marchetti SM.79s. Four fighter squadrons had 36 aircraft, comprising two nine-aircraft Fiat CR.32 squadrons and two nine-aircraft Fiat CR.42 Falco squadrons; CAAOI had one reconnaissance squadron with nine IMAM Ro.37 aircraft. There were 183 first line aircraft and another 140 in reserve, of which 59 were operational and 81 were unserviceable. On the outbreak of war, the CAAOI had 10,700 t (10,500 long tons) of aviation fuel, 5,300 t (5,200 long tons) of bombs and 8,620,000 rounds of ammunition. Aircraft and engine maintenance was conducted at the main air bases and at the Caproni and Piaggio workshops, which could repair about fifteen seriously-damaged aircraft and engines each month, along with some moderately and lightly damaged aircraft and could also recycle scarce materials. The Italians had reserves for 75 per cent of their front-line strength but lacked spare parts and many aircraft were cannibalised to keep others operational. The quality of the units varied. The SM.79 was the only modern bomber and the CR.32 fighter was obsolete but the Regia Aeronautica in East Africa had a cadre of highly experienced Spanish Civil War veterans. There was the nucleus of a transport fleet, with nine Savoia-Marchetti S.73, nine Ca.133, six Ca.148 (a lengthened version of the Ca.133) and a Fokker F.VII, which maintained internal communications and carried urgent items and personnel between sectors.
Regia Marina
From 1935 to 1940 the Regia Marina (Italian Royal Navy) laid plans for an ocean-going "escape fleet" (Flotta d'evasione) equipped for service in the tropics. The plans varied from three battleships, an aircraft carrier, twelve cruisers, 36 destroyers and 30 submarines to a more realistic two cruisers, eight destroyers and twelve submarines. Even the lower establishment proved too expensive and in 1940 the Red Sea Flotilla had seven older fleet destroyers, the 5th Destroyer Division with the Leone-class destroyers Pantera, Tigre and Leone and the 3rd Destroyer Division with the Sauro-class torpedo boats (a class of ships between the size of small, fast motor torpedo boats and destroyers, not found in the Royal Navy) Francesco Nullo, Nazario Sauro, Cesare Battisti and Daniele Manin. There were Orsini and Acerbi two old local defence torpedo boats and a squadron of five first world war Motoscafo Armato Silurante (MAS, motor torpedo boats). The Flotilla had eight modern submarines (Archimede, Galileo Ferraris, Galileo Galilei, Torricelli, Galvani, Guglielmotti, Macallé and Perla). The flotilla was based at Massawa in Eritrea on the Red Sea. The port linked Axis-occupied Europe and the naval facilities in the Italian concession zone at Tientsin in China. There were limited port facilities at Assab, in Eritrea and at Mogadishu in Italian Somaliland. When the Mediterranean route was closed to Allied merchant ships in April 1940, the Italian naval bases in East Africa were well placed for attacks on convoys en route to Suez up the east coast of Africa and through the Red Sea. The finite resources in Italian East Africa were intended to last for a war of about six months' duration, the submarines denying the Red Sea route to the British.
Mediterranean and Middle East
The British had based forces in Egypt since 1882 but these were greatly reduced by the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. A small British and Commonwealth force garrisoned the Suez Canal and the Red Sea route, which was vital to British communications with its Indian Ocean and Far Eastern territories. In mid-1939, General Archibald Wavell was appointed General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C) of the new Middle East Command, over the Mediterranean and Middle East theatres. Wavell was responsible for the defence of Egypt through the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, British Troops Egypt, to train the Egyptian Army. Wavell also had to co-ordinate military operations with the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, Admiral Andrew Cunningham, the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies (Vice-Admiral Ralph Leatham) the Commander-in-Chief India, General Robert Cassels, the Inspector General, African Colonial Forces, Major-General Douglas Dickinson and the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Middle East, Air Chief Marshal William Mitchell. French divisions in Tunisia faced the Italian 5th Army on the Libyan frontier, until the Franco-Axis Armistice of 22 June 1940.) In Libya, the Regio Esercito Italiana (Royal Italian Army) had about 215,000 men and in Egypt, the British had about 36,000 troops, with another 27,500 men training in Palestine. Wavell had about 86,000 troops for Libya, Iraq, Syria, Iran and East Africa.
=== Middle East Command === Middle East Command was established before the war to control land operations and co-ordinate with the naval and air commands in the Mediterranean and Middle East. Wavell was allowed only five staff officers for plans and command of an area of 3,500,000 sq mi (9,100,000 km2). From 1940 to 1941, operations took place in the Western Desert of Egypt, East Africa, Greece and the Middle East. In July 1939, Wavell devised a strategy to defend and then to dominate the Mediterranean as a base to attack Germany through eastern and south-eastern Europe. The conquest of Italian East Africa came second only to the defence of Egypt and the Suez Canal. In August, Wavell ordered for plans to be made quickly to gain control of the Red Sea. He specified a concept of offensive operations from Djibouti to Harar and then Addis Ababa or Kassala to Asmara then Massawa, preferably on both lines simultaneously. Wavell reconnoitred East Africa in January 1940 and the theatre was formally added to his responsibilities. He expected that the Somalilands could be defended with minor reinforcement. If Italy joined the war, Ethiopia would be invaded as soon as there were sufficient troops. Wavell also co-ordinated plans with South Africa in March. On 1 May 1940, Wavell ordered British Troops Egypt to mobilise discreetly for military operations in western Egypt but after the June debacle in France, Wavell had to follow a defensive strategy. After Italian operations in Sudan at Kassala and Gallabat in June, Winston Churchill blamed Wavell for a "static policy". Anthony Eden, the Secretary of State for War, communicated to Wavell that an Italian advance towards Khartoum should be destroyed. Wavell replied that the Italian attacks were not serious but went to Sudan and Kenya to see for himself and met Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie at Khartoum. Eden convened a conference in Khartoum at the end of October 1940 with Selassie, South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts (an advisor to Churchill), Wavell, Lieutenant-General William Platt and Lieutenant-General Alan Cunningham. A plan to attack Ethiopia, including support for Ethiopian irregular forces, was agreed. In November 1940, the British gained an intelligence advantage when the Government Code and Cypher School (GC & CS) at Bletchley Park broke the high grade cypher of the Italian Army in East Africa. Later that month, the replacement cypher for the Regia Aeronautica was broken by the Combined Bureau, Middle East (CBME). In September 1940, Wavell ordered the commanders in Sudan and Kenya to make limited attacks once the rainy season had ended. On the northern front, Platt was to attack Gallabat and the vicinity; on the southern front, Cunningham was to advance northwards from Kenya through Italian Somaliland into Ethiopia. In early November 1940, Cunningham had taken over the East African Force from Dickinson, who was in poor health. While Platt advanced from the north and Cunningham from the south, Wavell planned for a third force to be landed in British Somaliland by amphibious assault to re-take the colony, prior to advancing into Ethiopia. The three forces were to rendezvous at Addis Ababa. The conquest of the AOI would remove the land threat to supplies and reinforcements coming from Australia, New Zealand, India, South Africa and British East Africa via the Suez Canal for the Western Desert campaign and re-open the land route from Cape Town to Cairo.
==== East Africa Force ==== On 10 June 1940, East Africa Force (Major-General Douglas Dickinson) was established for North-East Africa, East Africa and British Central Africa. In Sudan about 8,500 troops and 80 aircraft guarded a 1,200 mi (1,900 km) frontier with the AOI. Platt had 21 companies (4,500 men) of the Sudan Defence Force (SDF) of which five (later six) were organised as motor machine-gun companies. There was no artillery, but the Sudan Horse was converting to a 3.7-inch mountain howitzer battery. The 1st Battalion Worcestershire Regiment, 1st Battalion Essex Regiment and the 2nd Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment, were, in mid-September, incorporated into the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, 10th Indian Infantry Brigade and 9th Indian Infantry Brigade respectively of the 5th Indian Infantry Division (Major-General Lewis Heath) when it arrived. The 4th Indian Infantry Division (Major-General Noel Beresford-Peirse) was transferred from Egypt in December. The British had an assortment of armoured cars and B Squadron 4th Royal Tank Regiment (4th RTR) with Matilda infantry tanks joined the 4th Indian Division in January 1941. On the outbreak of hostilities, Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Reginald Chater in British Somaliland had about 1,754 troops comprising the Somaliland Camel Corps (SCC) and a battalion of the 1st Battalion Northern Rhodesia Regiment. By August, the 1/2nd Punjab and 3/5th Punjab regiments had been transferred from Aden and the 2nd Battalion of the King's African Rifles (KAR) with the 1st East African Light Battery (3.7-inch howitzers) came from Kenya, raising the total to 4,000 troops, in the first week of August. In the Aden Protectorate, British Forces Aden (Air Vice-Marshal George Reid) had a garrison of the two Indian infantry battalions until they were transferred to British Somaliland in August.
==== Ethiopia ==== In August 1939, Wavell had ordered a covert plan to encourage the rebellion in the western Ethiopian province of Gojjam, which the Italians had never been able to repress. In September, Colonel Daniel Sandford arrived to run the project, but until the Italian declaration of war, the conspiracy was held back by the government's policy of appeasement. Mission 101 was formed to co-ordinate the activities of the Ethiopian resistance. In June 1940, Selassie arrived in Egypt and in July, went to Sudan to meet Platt and discuss plans to recapture Ethiopia, despite Platt's reservations. In July, the British recognised Selassie as emperor and in August, Mission 101 entered Gojjam province to reconnoitre. Sandford requested that supply routes be established before the rains ended, to the area north of Lake Tana and that Selassie should return in October, as a catalyst for the uprising. Gaining control of Gojjam required the Italian garrisons to be isolated along the main road from Bahir Dar Giorgis south of Lake Tana, to Dangila, Debre Markos and Addis Ababa to prevent them concentrating against the Arbegnoch (Amharic for Patriots). Italian reinforcements arrived in October and patrolled more frequently, just as dissensions among local potentates were reconciled by Sandford's diplomacy. The Frontier Battalion of the Sudan Defence Force, set up in May 1940, was joined at Khartoum by the 2nd Ethiopian and 4th Eritrean battalions, which were raised from émigré volunteers in Kenya. Operational Centres consisting of an officer, five NCOs and several picked Ethiopians were formed and trained in guerrilla warfare to provide leadership cadres and £1 million was set aside to finance operations. Major Orde Wingate was sent to Khartoum with an assistant to join the headquarters of the SDF. On 20 November, Wingate was flown to Sakhala to meet Sandford, and the RAF managed to bomb Dangila, drop propaganda leaflets and supply Mission 101, which raised Ethiopian morale, which had suffered much from Italian air power since the Second Italo-Abyssinian War. Mission 101 managed to persuade the Arbegnoch north of Lake Tana to spring several ambushes on the Metemma–Gondar road, and the Italian garrison at Wolkait was withdrawn in February 1941.
Northern front, 1940
British Somaliland 1940
On 4 August, the Italians advanced with a western column towards Zeila, a central column (Lieutenant-General Carlo De Simone) towards Hargeisa and an eastern column towards Odweina in the south. The SCC skirmished with the advancing Italians as the main British force slowly retired. On 5 August, the towns of Zeila and Hargeisa were captured, cutting off the British from French Somaliland. Odweina fell the following day and the Italian central and eastern columns joined. On 11 August, Major-General Alfred Reade Godwin-Austen was diverted to Berbera, en route to Kenya to take command as reinforcements increased the British garrison to five battalions. (From 5 to 19 August, RAF squadrons based at Aden flew 184 sorties, dropped 60 long tons (61 t) of bombs, lost seven aircraft destroyed and ten damaged.)
Battle of Tug Argan
On 11 August, the Italians began the Battle of Tug Argan (tug, a dry, sandy riverbed), where the road from Hargeisa crosses the Assa hills and by 14 August, the British were at risk of defeat in detail by the larger Italian force and its greater quantity of artillery. Close to being cut off and with only one battalion left in reserve, Godwin-Austen contacted Henry Maitland Wilson, commander of the British Troops in Egypt in Cairo (Wavell was in London) and received permission to withdraw from the colony. The 2nd Battalion, Black Watch, supported by two companies of the 2nd King's African Rifles and parties of the 1st/2nd Punjab Regiment covered the retreat of the British contingent to Berbera. By 2:00 p.m. on 18 August, most of the contingent had been evacuated to Aden but HMAS Hobart and the HQ stayed behind until morning before sailing and the Italians entered Berbera on the evening of 19 August. In the final four days, the RAF flew twelve reconnaissance and 19 reconnaissance-bombing sorties, with 72 attacks on Italian transport and troop columns; 36 fighter sorties were flown over Berbera. The British suffered casualties of 38 killed and 222 wounded; the Italians suffered 2,052 casualties; fuel and ammunition expenditure and wear and tear on vehicles was difficult to remedy, which forced the Italians to return to the defensive. Churchill criticised Wavell for abandoning the colony without enough fighting but Wavell called it a textbook withdrawal in the face of superior numbers.
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan
On 4 July 1940, the Italians launched a limited offensive to capture Sudanese settlements near the border with the AOI, to strengthen their defensive perimeter, most notably with the Battle of Kassala. Advancing on Kassala were two colonial infantry brigades, four squadrons of cavalry, approximately 24 armoured vehicles (light tanks, medium tanks and armoured cars) and ten batteries of artillery. Many of the troops were Askari in Italian service. Starting out from Teseney, in Eritrea to the south east of Kassala, the Italian force moved in three columns, one of which approached Kassala from the east (consisting mainly of cavalry) while the other two advanced on either side of the Gash River. Kassala had a garrison of around 500 men of the SDF and the local police, with no artillery support or armoured vehicles. The SDF force consisted of two motorised infantry companies and one mounted infantry company. The action began with an air raid by the Regia Aeronautica, then at 06:30 Italian cavalry arrived and engaged the defenders outside of the town. SDF troops in lorries with machine guns carried out hit-and-run attacks on the flanks and tails of the Italian columns. Despite being outnumbered and having no artillery or air support, the SDF and police made a determined defence that inflicted significantly more losses on the attackers than they received. The Italians lost 117 troops, and the SDF lost ten. Barrie Pitt described the action as "brisk but short-lived". The defenders withdrew from Kassala and reassembled at Butana Bridge, the next stop on the railway line. The Italians drove a platoon of No 3 Company, Eastern Arab Corps (EAC) of the SDF, from the small fort at Gallabat, just over the border from Metemma, about 200 mi (320 km) south of Kassala and took the villages of Qaysān, Kurmuk and Dumbode on the Blue Nile. From there the Italians ventured no further into Sudan owing to a lack of fuel; The Italians fortified Kassala with anti-tank defences, machine-gun posts and strongpoints, later establishing a brigade-strong garrison. The Italians were disappointed to find little anti-British sentiment among the Sudanese population. The 5th Indian Division began to arrive in Sudan in early September 1940. The 29th Indian Infantry Brigade were placed on the Red Sea coast to protect Port Sudan, the 9th Indian Infantry Brigade was based south-west of Kassala and the 10th Indian Infantry Brigade (William Slim) was sent to Gedaref, with the divisional headquarters, to block an Italian attack on Khartoum from Goz Regeb to Gallabat, on a front of 200 mi (320 km). Gazelle Force (Colonel Frank Messervy) was formed on 16 October, as a mobile unit to raid Italian territory and delay an Italian advance. Gallabat fort lay in Sudan and Metemma a short way across the Ethiopian border, beyond the Boundary Khor, a dry riverbed with steep banks covered by long grass. Both places were surrounded by field fortifications and Gallabat was held by a colonial infantry battalion. Metemma had two colonial battalions and a banda formation, all under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Castagnola. The 10th Indian Infantry Brigade, a field artillery regiment and B Squadron, 6th RTR with seven Cruiser Mk I (A9) tanks and seven Light Tank Mk VI, attacked Gallabat on 6 November at 5:30 a.m. An RAF contingent of six Wellesley bombers and nine Gladiator fighters, were thought sufficient to overcome the 17 Italian fighters and 32 bombers believed to be in range. The infantry assembled 1–2 mi (1.6–3.2 km) from Gallabat, whose garrison was unaware that an attack was coming, until the RAF bombed the fort and put the wireless out of action. The field artillery began a simultaneous bombardment; after an hour the gunners changed targets and bombarded Metemma. The previous night, the 4th Battalion 10th Baluch Regiment occupied a hill overlooking the fort as a flank guard. The troops on the hill covered the advance at 6:40 a.m. of the 3rd Royal Garwhal Rifles followed by the tanks. The Indians reached Gallabat and fought hand-to-hand with the 65th Infantry Division "Granatieri di Savoia" and some Eritrean troops in the fort. At 8:00 a.m. the 25th and 77th Colonial battalions counter-attacked and were repulsed but three British tanks were knocked out by mines and six by mechanical failure caused by the rocky ground. The defenders at Boundary Khor were dug in behind fields of barbed wire and Castagnola had contacted Gondar for air support. Italian bombers and fighters attacked all day, shot down seven Gladiators for a loss of five Fiat CR-42s and destroyed the lorry carrying spare parts for the tanks. The ground was so hard and rocky that there were no trenches and when Italian bombers made their biggest attack, the infantry had no cover. An ammunition lorry was set on fire by burning grass and the sound was taken to be an Italian counter-attack from behind. When a platoon advanced towards the sound with fixed bayonets, some troops thought that they were retreating. Part of the 1st Battalion, Essex Regiment at the fort broke and ran, taking some of the Gahrwalis with them. Many of the British fugitives mounted their transport and drove off, spreading the panic and some of the runaways reached Doka before being stopped. The Italian bombers returned the next morning and Slim ordered a withdrawal from Gallabat Ridge 3 mi (4.8 km) west, to less exposed ground that evening. Sappers from the 21st Field Company remained behind to demolish the remaining buildings and stores in the fort. The artillery bombarded Gallabat and Metemma and set off Italian ammunition dumps full of pyrotechnics. British casualties since 6 November were 42 men killed and 125 wounded. The brigade patrolled to deny the fort to the Italians and on 9 November, two Baluch companies attacked and held the fort during the day and retired in the evening. During the night an Italian counter-attack was repulsed by artillery-fire and next morning the British re-occupied the fort unopposed. Ambushes were laid and prevented Italian reinforcements from occupying the fort or the hills on the flanks, despite frequent bombing by the Regia Aeronautica.
Southern front, 1940
British East Africa (Kenya)
On the Italian declaration of war on 10 June 1940, East Africa Force (Lieutenant-General Douglas Dickinson) comprised two East African brigades of the King's African Rifles organised as a Northern Brigade and a Southern Brigade with a reconnaissance regiment, a light artillery battery and the 22nd Mountain Battery Royal Indian Artillery (RIA). By March 1940, the KAR strength had reached 883 officers, 1,374 non-commissioned officers and 20,026 African other ranks. Wavell ordered Dickinson to defend Kenya and to pin down as many Italian troops as possible. Dickinson planned to defend Mombasa with the 1st East African Infantry Brigade and to deny a crossing of the Tana River and the fresh water at Wajir with the 2nd East African Infantry Brigade. Detachments were to be placed at Marsabit, Moyale and at Turkana near Lake Rudolf (now Lake Turkana), an arc 850 mi (1,370 km) long. The Italians were thought to have troops at Kismayo, Mogadishu, Dolo, Moyale and Yavello, which turned out to be colonial troops and bande, with two brigades at Jimma, ready to reinforce Moyale or attack Lake Rudolf and then invade Uganda. By the end of July, the 3rd East African Infantry Brigade and the 6th East African Infantry Brigade had been formed. A Coastal Division and a Northern Frontier District Division had been planned but then the 11th (African) Division and the 12th (African) Division were created instead. On 1 June, the first South African unit arrived at the port of Mombasa in Kenya and by the end of July, the 1st South African Infantry Brigade Group had arrived. On 13 August, the 1st South African Division was formed and by the end of 1940, about 27,000 South Africans were in East Africa, in the 1st South African Division, the 11th (African) Division and the 12th (African) Division. Each South African brigade group consisted of three rifle battalions, an armoured car company and signal, engineer and medical units. By July, under the terms of a war contingency plan, the 2nd (West Africa) Infantry Brigade, from the Gold Coast (Ghana) and the 1st (West Africa) Infantry Brigade from Nigeria, were provided for service in Kenya by the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF). The 1st (West African) Brigade, the two KAR brigades and some South African units, formed the 11th (African) Division. The 12th (African) Division had a similar formation with the 2nd (West African) Brigade. At dawn on 17 June, the Rhodesians supported a raid by the SDF on the Italian desert outpost of El Wak in Italian Somaliland about 90 mi (140 km) north-east of Wajir. The Rhodesians bombed and burnt down thatched mud huts and generally harassed Italian troops. Since the main fighting at that time was against Italian advances towards Moyale in Kenya, the Rhodesians concentrated there. On 1 July, Moyale, on the edge of the Ethiopian escarpment, where the tracks towards Wajir and Marsabit meet, was attacked. The Italians were repulsed by a company of the 1st KAR and reinforcements were moved up. The Italians carried out a larger attack by about four battalions on 10 July, after a considerable artillery bombardment and after three days the British withdrew unopposed, in the Capture of Moyale. The Italians eventually advanced to water holes at Dabel and Buna, nearly 62 mi (100 km) inside Kenya but lack of supplies prevented a further advance.
Italian strategy, December 1940
In late 1940, Italian forces suffered defeats in the Mediterranean Campaign, Operation Compass in the Western Desert, the Battle of Britain and in the Greco-Italian War. General Ugo Cavallero, the new Italian Chief of the Chief of the General Staff, thought that the Italians should abandon offensive actions against Sudan and the Suez Canal and concentrate on the defence of the AOI. After Cavallero and Aosta requested permission to withdraw from the Sudanese frontier, the Italian forces in East Africa withdrew to better defensive positions. Frusci was ordered to retire from Kassala and Metemma in the lowlands along the Eritrea–Sudan border and hold the mountain passes on the Kassala–Agordat and Metemma–Gondar roads. Frusci chose not to withdraw from the lowlands, because withdrawal would involve too great a loss of prestige and because Kassala was an important railway junction; holding it prevented the British from using the railway to carry supplies from Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast to their base at Gedaref. Information on the Italian withdrawal plan was quickly decrypted by the British and Platt begin his offensive into Eritrea on 18 January 1941, three weeks early.
War in the air
In Sudan, the Royal Air Force (RAF) Air Headquarters Sudan (Headquarters 203 Group from 17 August, Air Headquarters East Africa from 19 October), subordinate to the AOC-in-C Middle East, had 14 Squadron, 47 Squadron and 223 Squadron (Wellesley bombers). A flight of Vincent biplanes from 47 Squadron performed Army Co-operation duties and were later reinforced from Egypt by 45 squadron (Blenheims). Six Gladiator biplane fighters were based in Port Sudan for trade protection and anti-submarine patrols over the Red Sea, the air defence of Port Sudan, Atbara and Khartoum and for army support. In May, 1 (Fighter) Squadron South African Air Force (SAAF) arrived, was transferred to Egypt to convert to Gladiators and returned to Khartoum in August. The SAAF in Kenya comprised 12 Squadron (Junkers Ju 86 bombers), 11 Squadron (Battle bombers), 40 Squadron and 41 Squadron (Hart light bombers), 2 Squadron (Fury fighters) and 237 (Rhodesia) Squadron RAF (Hardy general-purpose aircraft). Better aircraft became available later but the first aircraft were old and slow, the South Africans even pressing an old Valentia biplane into service as a bomber. The South Africans faced experienced Italian pilots, including a cadre of Spanish Civil War veterans. Despite its lack of experience, 1 Squadron claimed 48 enemy aircraft destroyed and 57 damaged; 57 aircraft were claimed destroyed on the ground for the loss of six pilots. (It is thought that the South Africans over-claimed their results). From November 1940 to early January 1941, Platt put pressure on the Italians along the Ethiopia–Sudan border with patrols and raids by ground troops and aircraft. Hurricanes and more Gladiators began to replace some of the older models. On 6 December, a large concentration of Italian motor transport was bombed and strafed by Commonwealth aircraft a few miles north of Kassala. The same aircraft then proceeded to machine-gun from low level the nearby positions of the Italian Blackshirts and colonial infantry. A few days later, the aircraft bombed the Italian base at Keru, fifty miles east of Kassala. The Commonwealth pilots had the satisfaction of seeing supply dumps, stores and transport enveloped in flame and smoke as they flew away. One morning in mid-December, a force of Italian fighters strafed a Rhodesian landing-strip at Wajir near Kassala, where two Hardys were caught on the ground and destroyed; 5,000 US gal (19,000 L; 4,200 imp gal) of fuel were set alight and four Africans were killed and eleven injured fighting the fire.
War at sea, 1940
The approaches to the Red Sea through the Gulf of Aden and the Bab-el-Mandeb (Gate of Tears Strait) is 15 nmi (28 km; 17 mi) wide. With the Italian declaration of war on 10 June and the loss of French naval support in the Mediterranean after the Armistice of 22 June, the 1,200 nmi (2,200 km; 1,400 mi)-long Red Sea passage to Suez became the main British sea route to the Middle East. South of Suez the British-held Port Sudan, about halfway down on the Sudan coast and the base at Aden, 100 nmi (190 km; 120 mi) east of Bab-el-Mandeb on the Arabian Peninsula. The principal Italian naval force (Contrammiraglio [Rear-Admiral] Mario Bonetti) was based at Massawa in Eritrea, about 350 nmi (650 km; 400 mi) north of the Bab-el-Mandeb, well placed for the Red Sea Flotilla to attack Allied convoys. British code-breakers of the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park in England, deciphered Italian orders of 19 May, coded using C38m machines, secretly to mobilise the army and air force in East Africa. Merchant traffic was stopped by the British on 24 May, pending the introduction of a convoy system. The Red Sea Force (Senior Naval Officer Red Sea, Rear-Admiral Arthur Murray), operational at Aden since April with the light cruisers HMS Liverpool and HMAS Hobart (Liverpool was replaced by HMS Leander), was reinforced by the anti-aircraft cruiser HMS Carlisle, which sailed south with Convoy BS 4, the 28th Destroyer Flotilla comprising HMS Khartoum, Kimberley, Kingston and Kandahar and three sloops from the Mediterranean. The force was to conduct a blockade Italian East Africa (Operation Begum), attack the Red Sea Flotilla and protect the sea route from Aden to Suez. On 6 June, the Azio-class minelayer Ostia used 470 mines to lay eight barrages off Massawa and the destroyer Pantera dropped 110 mines in two barrages off Assab the day after. When Italy declared war on 10 June, Galileo Ferraris sailed for French Somaliland (Djibouti), Galileo Galilei to Aden, Galvani to the Gulf of Oman and Mecallé to Port Sudan. On 14 June Torricelli put to sea to relieve Galileo Ferraris whose crew had been incapacitated by chloromethane poisoning from the refrigeration system. The crew of Macallé was also afflicted; the boat was run aground and lost on 15 June. On 18 June, Galileo Galilei boarded and released the neutral Yugoslav steamship Dravo and the next day engaged the armed trawler HMS Moonstone off Aden. All but one officer was killed by shell-fire and Galileo Galilei was captured along with many documents including operational orders for four other Italian submarines. Archimede, Perla and Guglielmotti sailed from 19 to 21 June. On 26 June, Guglielmotti ran onto a shoal and suffered severe damage; the wreck was salvaged later. Documents recovered from Galileo Galilei were used to intercept and damage Torricelli on 21 June. The submarine headed for home but was caught off Perim Island and sunk by Kandahar, Kingston, Khartoum and the sloop Shoreham. Several hours afterwards, a torpedo on Khartoum, damaged by a shell from Torricelli, exploded and caused an uncontrollable fire. Khartoum tried to reach Perim Harbour about 7 nmi (13 km; 8.1 mi) distant but the crew and prisoners had to abandon ship; later a magazine explosion wrecked the vessel. The sloop Falmouth exploited the document find from Galileo Galilei to sink Galvani in the Gulf of Oman on 24 June. On 13 August, Galileo Ferraris made an abortive attempt to intercept the battleship HMS Royal Sovereign en route from Suez to Aden.
From 13 to 19 August Kimberley and the sloop HMS Auckland bombarded Italian troops advancing west of Berbera in British Somaliland. Italian air raids on Berbera caused splinter damage to Hobart as it participated in the evacuation of Berbera with Carlisle, Caledon Ceres, Kandahar, Kimberley and the sloops Shoreham, HMAS Parramatta, Auckland, auxiliary cruisers Chakdina, Chantala and Laomédon, the transport HMIS Akbar and the hospital ship HMHS Vita, lifting 5,960 troops, 1,266 civilians and 184 sick and wounded. On 18 November the cruiser HMS Dorsetshire bombarded Zante in Italian Somaliland British naval forces supported land operations and blockaded the remnants the Red Sea Flotilla at Massawa. By the end of 1940, the British had gained control of East African coastal routes and the Red Sea; Italian forces in the AOI declined as fuel, spare parts and supplies from Italy ran out. There were six Italian air attacks on convoys in October and none after 4 November.
Red Sea convoys
During 16 June 1940, Galileo Galilei sank the Norwegian tanker James Stove (8,215 gross register tons [GRT]), sailing independently about 12 nmi (22 km; 14 mi) south of Aden. On 2 July the first of the BN convoys (Bombay Northward; Bombay to Suez, then Aden to Suez 1940–1941), comprising six tankers and three freighters, assembled in the Gulf of Aden. Italian sorties against the BN–BS convoys (Bombay Southward; Suez to Aden, late 1940 to early 1941) were dispiriting failures; from 26 to 31 July, Guglielmotti failed to find two Greek merchantmen and a sortie by the torpedo boats Cesare Battisti and Francesco Nullo was also abortive. Guglielmotti from 21 to 25 August, Galileo Ferraris (25–31 August), Francesco Nullo and Nazario Sauro from 24 to 25 August and the destroyers Pantera and Tigre (28–29 August) failed to find Greek ships in the Red Sea, despite agent reports and sightings by air reconnaissance. Italian aircraft and submarines had little more success. On the night of 5/6 September, Cesare Battisti, Daniele Manin and Nazario Sauro sailed, followed on 6/7 September by the destroyers Leone and Tigre to attack a northbound convoy (BN 4) found by air reconnaissance but found nothing. Further to the north, Galileo Ferraris and Guglielmotti also failed to find BN 4 but Guglielmotti torpedoed the Greek tanker Atlas (4,008 GRT) south of the Farasan Islands straggling behind the convoy. Leone, Pantera, Cesare Battisti and Daniele Manin with the submarines Archimede and Gugliemotti failed to find a convoy of 23 ships spotted by air reconnaissance. Bhima (5,280 GRT) in convoy BN 5 was damaged by bombs and one man killed; the ship was towed to Aden and beached. In August the British ran four convoys in each direction, five in September and seven in October, 86 ships in BN convoys and 72 in BS (southbound) convoys; the Regia Aeronautica managed only six air attacks in October and none after 4 November. The Attack on Convoy BN 7, took place from 20 to 21 October and was the only destroyer attack on a convoy, despite gaining precise information on BN convoys as they passed French Somaliland. The 31 ships of BN 7 were escorted by the cruiser Leander, the destroyer HMS Kimberley, the sloops Auckland, HMAS Yarra and HMIS Indus with the minesweepers Derby and Huntley, with air cover from Aden. Guglielmo Marconi and Galileo Ferraris, stationed to the north, failed to intercept the convoy but on 21 October the destroyers Nazario Sauro and Francesco Nullo with the destroyers Pantera, Leone attacked the convoy 150 nmi (280 km; 170 mi) east of Massawa; the attackers caused only superficial damage to one ship. Kimberley forced Francesco Nullo aground on an island near Massawa, at the Action off Harmil Island on the morning of 21 October. Kimberley was hit in the engine room by a shore battery and had to be towed to Port Sudan by Leander. The wreck of Francesco Nullo was bombed on 21 October by three Blenheims of 45 Squadron. From 22 to 28 November, Archimede and Galileo Ferraris sailed to investigate reports of a convoy but found nothing, as did Tigre, Leone, Daniele Manin, Nazario Sauro and Galileo Ferraris from 3 to 5 December. From 12 to 22 December Archimede sailed twice after ship sightings but both sorties came to nothing; Galileo Ferraris sortied off Port Sudan. from June to December the RAF had escorted 54 BN and BS convoys from which one ship was sunk and one damaged by Italian aircraft.
French Somaliland 1940–1942
The governor of French Somaliland (now Djibouti), Brigadier-General Paul Legentilhomme had a garrison of seven battalions of Senegalese and Somali infantry, three batteries of field guns, four batteries of anti-aircraft guns, a company of light tanks, four companies of militia and irregulars, two platoons of the camel corps and an assortment of aircraft. After visiting from 8 to 13 January 1940, Wavell decided that Legentilhomme would command the military forces in both Somalilands should war with Italy come. In June, an Italian force was assembled to capture the port city of Djibouti, the main military base. After the fall of France in June, the neutralisation of Vichy French colonies allowed the Italians to concentrate on the more lightly defended British Somaliland. On 23 July, Legentilhomme was ousted by the pro-Vichy naval officer Pierre Nouailhetas and left on 5 August for Aden, to join the Free French. In March 1941, the British enforcement of a strict contraband regime to prevent supplies being passed on to the Italians, lost its point after the conquest of the AOI. The British changed policy, with encouragement from the Free French, to "rally French Somaliland to the Allied cause without bloodshed". The Free French were to arrange a voluntary ralliement by propaganda (Operation Marie) and the British were to blockade the colony. Wavell considered that if British pressure was applied, a rally would appear to have been coerced. Wavell preferred to let the propaganda continue and provided a small amount of supplies under strict control. When the policy had no effect, Wavell suggested negotiating with the Vichy governor Louis Nouailhetas, to use the port and railway. The suggestion was accepted by the British government but because of the concessions granted to the Vichy regime in Syria, proposals were made to invade the colony instead. In June, Nouailhetas was given an ultimatum, the blockade was tightened and the Italian garrison at Assab was defeated by an operation from Aden. For six months, Nouailhetas remained willing to grant concessions over the port and railway but would not tolerate Free French interference. In October the blockade was reviewed but the beginning of the war with Japan in December, led to all but two blockade ships being withdrawn. On 2 January 1942, the Vichy government offered the use of the port and railway, subject to the lifting of the blockade but the British refused and ended the blockade unilaterally in March.