Since April 2023, there has been a civil war in Sudan between the two main factions of the country's military government. The conflict involves the internationally recognized government of Sudan led by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan; against the rival Government of Peace and Unity led by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group, commanded by General Hemedti (Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo Musa). Smaller armed groups have also taken part on both sides, most notably Sudan Liberation Movement splinter groups, the Tamazuj militia, and the Darfur Joint Protection Force. Fighting began on 15 April 2023 following a power struggle within the transitional administration established after the 2021 coup. As of 6 July 2026, the conflict has forcibly displaced over 14 million people, with 4.5 million fleeing the country as refugees, making it one of the largest displacement crises in recent history. The conflict has also seen heavy influence from foreign powers, especially Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates, while also experiencing effects from the spillover of neighboring conflicts in the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad and Libya. The current war erupted amid tensions regarding the integration of the RSF into the Sudanese Army following the 2021 coup. Initial RSF attacks targeted government sites in the capital, Khartoum, and other cities. The conflict began with the Battle of Khartoum, and fighting then spread to the Darfur region. The capital region was divided between the two factions, and al-Burhan relocated his government to Port Sudan. International efforts, including the 2023 Jeddah Declaration, failed to stop the fighting, while various rebel groups entered the war: the SPLM–North attacked the SAF in the south; the Tamazuj movement joined the RSF; and the SAF gained support from factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement and Justice and Equality Movement. By late 2023, the RSF controlled most of Darfur and advanced on Khartoum, taking over most of the capital, Kordofan and Gezira. The SAF regained momentum in 2024, making gains in Omdurman and retaking Khartoum by March 2025. Despite negotiations, no lasting ceasefire has been reached, and the war continues with severe humanitarian consequences and regional implications. The city of El Fasher, the SAF's last stronghold in Darfur, was besieged by the RSF from April 2024. On 26 October 2025, the city fell to the RSF, with the city and neighboring villages suffering what some experts called a genocidal massacre inflicting between 60,000 and 70,000 deaths by one estimate. Satellite estimates have been as high as 150,000 dead, making it the largest massacre of the 21st century. Sudan faces one of the world's most severe humanitarian crises, with widespread famine and 25 million people suffering severe food insecurity. Four million children are acutely malnourished, including 770,000 at imminent risk of death, and famine has been confirmed in several regions. The country faces extreme shortages of water, medicine and aid access, widespread hospital closures, disease outbreaks, mass displacement, looting of humanitarian supplies, and the near-collapse of education and infrastructure, leaving half the population in urgent need. The total death toll of the war comprises fatalities from violence, starvation and disease; thousands remain missing or were killed in targeted massacres primarily attributed to the RSF and allied militias. 61,000 people have died in Khartoum State alone, of whom 26,000 were direct victims of violence. Sexual violence has been widespread. UN under-secretary for humanitarian affairs Tom Fletcher described Darfur as the "epicenter of human suffering in the world". There have been calls for more aid, legal protections for humanitarian workers, refugee support and a halt to international arms supplies to the RSF, particularly from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The US, UK, EU and Canada imposed sanctions on entities linked to both factions for ceasefire violations and human rights abuses. Despite denials, the UAE has been found to violate these sanctions by shipping Chinese weaponry to the RSF, which largely funds its operations through gold exports to the UAE. Many civilians in Darfur have been killed as part of the Masalit genocide. On 7 January 2025, the United States government formally determined that the RSF and its allied militias committed acts of genocide.
Background
Since gaining independence in 1956, Sudan has endured chronic instability marked by 20 coup attempts and prolonged military rule, usually interspersed with short periods of democratic parliamentary rule. Two civil wars, 1955–1972 and 1983–2005, were fought between the central government and the southern regions, killing 1.5 million people and ultimately leading to the independence of South Sudan in 2011. Separately, the conflict in the western region of Darfur displaced two million people and killed more than 200,000.
=== War in Darfur and the formation of the RSF === By the turn of the 21st century, Sudan's western Darfur region had endured prolonged instability and social strife due to ethnic tensions and disputes over land and water. In 2003, this situation erupted into a full-scale rebellion, which president and military strongman Omar al-Bashir vowed to crush. The resulting War in Darfur was marked by widespread state-sponsored violence, leading to charges of war crimes and genocide against al-Bashir. The initial phase of the conflict left approximately 300,000 dead and 2.7 million forcibly displaced; even though the intensity of the violence later declined, the situation in the region remained far from peaceful. To crush uprisings by non-Arab tribes in the Nuba Mountains, al-Bashir relied upon the Janjaweed, a collection of Baggara Arab militias drawn from camel-trading tribes active in Darfur and portions of Chad. In 2013, al-Bashir announced that the Janjaweed would be reorganised as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under the command of the Janjaweed's commander General Hemedti. The RSF perpetrated mass killings, rapes, pillage, torture, and destruction of villages. They were accused of ethnic cleansing against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa peoples. Leaders of the RSF have been indicted for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC), but Hemedti was not personally implicated in the 2003–2004 atrocities. In 2017, a new law gave the RSF the status of an "independent security force". Hemedti received several gold mines in Darfur as patronage from al-Bashir, and his personal wealth grew substantially. Bashir sent RSF forces to quash a 2013 uprising in South Darfur and deployed RSF units to fight in Yemen and Libya. During this time, the RSF developed a working relationship with the Russian private military outfit Wagner Group. RSF forces grew into the tens of thousands and obtained thousands of armed pickup trucks which regularly patrolled the streets of Khartoum. The Bashir regime supported the RSF and other armed groups to "coup-proof" its power against challenges from within the regular armed forces.
Political transition
In December 2018, protests against al-Bashir's regime began, starting the first phase of the Sudanese revolution. Eight months of sustained civil disobedience were met with violent repression. In April 2019, the military (including the RSF) ousted al-Bashir in a coup d'état, ending his three decades of rule; the military established the Transitional Military Council (TMC), a junta. Bashir was imprisoned in Khartoum; he was not turned over to the ICC, which had issued warrants for his arrest. Protests calling for civilian rule continued. In June 2019, the TMC's security forces, including RSF and SAF, attacked persistent demonstrators in the Khartoum massacre, with more than a hundred demonstrators killed and dozens raped. Hemedti denied orchestrating the attack. In August 2019, in response to international pressure and mediation by the African Union and Ethiopia, the military agreed to share power in an interim joint civilian-military unity government (the Transitional Sovereignty Council, TSC), headed by a civilian Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, with elections planned for 2023. In October 2021, the military junta again seized power in a coup led by SAF leader al-Burhan and Hemedti. Al-Burhan became leader of the TSC government, halting Sudan's transition to democracy. Several factions oppose new elections in Sudan.
=== Origins of the SPLM–N and the SLM === The Sudan Liberation Movement (or Army; SLM, SLA, or SLM/A) is a rebel group in the region of Darfur, primarily of members of non-Arab ethnicities which had been repressed by the Bashir regime. Since 2006, the movement has split into several factions due to disagreements over the Darfur Peace Agreement, with some factions joining the government in Khartoum. By 2023, the three most prominent factions were the SLM-Minnawi under Minni Minnawi, the SLM-al-Nur under Abdul Wahid al-Nur, and the SLM-Tambour under Mustafa Tambour. The SLM-Minnawi and SLM-Tambour signed the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, but the SLM-al-Nur refused and kept fighting. The SPLM–N was founded by units of the predominantly South Sudanese Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army stationed in areas that remained in Sudan following the South Sudanese vote for independence in 2011. These forces then led a rebellion in the southern states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile a few months later. In 2017, the SPLM–N split between a faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu and one led by Malik Agar, with al-Hilu demanding secularism as a condition for peace, whereas Agar did not agree with this. During the Sudanese revolution, al-Hilu's faction declared an indefinite unilateral ceasefire. In 2020, a peace agreement was signed between the Sudanese government and Agar's faction, with Agar later joining the Transitional Sovereignty Council in Khartoum. Al-Hilu held out until he agreed to sign a separate peace agreement with the Sudanese government a few months later. Further steps to consolidate the agreement stalled following the 2021 coup, and the al-Hilu faction instead signed an agreement with the SLM-al-Nur and the Sudanese Communist Party, agreeing to co-operate to draft a 'revolutionary charter' and remove the military from power.
=== Prelude === In the months following the 2021 coup, the already weak Sudanese economy steeply declined, fueling wide protests demanding that the junta return power to civilian authorities. Tensions arose when al-Burhan appointed several old-guard Islamist officials who had dominated politics during the al-Bashir government; Hemedti saw this as an attempt to maintain the dominance of Khartoum's traditional elite, who were hostile to Hemedti due to his ethnic background as a Darfuri Arab. Hemedti expressed regret over his alliance with al-Burhan in the October 2021 coup. Tensions between the RSF and SAF escalated in February 2023, as the RSF began to recruit members across Sudan. Through February and early March, the RSF built up forces in the capital Khartoum, until a deal was brokered on 11 March and the RSF withdrew. Negotiations were held between the SAF, RSF, and civilian leaders, but they broke down. The chief dispute was over the integration of the RSF units into the regular SAF military: the RSF insisted on a ten-year timetable, while the army demanded two years. Other contested issues included the status of RSF officers in the future hierarchy, and whether RSF forces should be under the command of the army chief rather than Sudan's commander-in-chief, al-Burhan. On 11 April 2023, RSF forces deployed near the city of Merowe as well as in Khartoum. Government forces ordered them to leave and were refused. RSF forces then took forcible control of the Soba military base south of Khartoum. On 13 April, RSF forces began a general mobilization, raising fears of rebellion, and the SAF declared the mobilization illegal.
Course of the war
April–May 2023
Battle of Khartoum
On 15 April 2023, the RSF attacked SAF bases across Sudan, including Khartoum and its airport. There were clashes at the headquarters of the state broadcaster Sudan TV, eventually captured by RSF forces. Bridges and roads in Khartoum and its hinterland were closed by the RSF. The next day saw an SAF counteroffensive which retook Merowe Airport, near the headquarters of Sudan TV and state radio. The Sudan Civil Aviation Authority closed the country's airspace as fighting began. Telecommunications provider MTN shut down Internet services, and by 23 April there was a near-total internet outage attributed to attacks on the electricity grid. International trade began to break down, with the major shipping firm Maersk announcing a pause on new shipments.
Hemedti directed his forces to capture or kill al-Burhan, and RSF units engaged in pitched and bloody combat with the SAF Republican Guard. Al-Burhan was besieged and trapped in his headquarters in Khartoum. In an interview with Al Jazeera, Hemedti accused al-Burhan and his commanders of provoking the war by scheming to bring deposed Islamist leader Omar al-Bashir back to power. He called for the international community to intervene against al-Burhan, claiming that the RSF were fighting against radical Islamic militants. After a few days, SAF brought in reinforcements from the Ethiopian border. Despite a ceasefire announced for Eid al-Fitr, fighting continued across the country. Combat was described as particularly intense along the highway from Khartoum to Port Sudan and in the industrial zone of al-Bagair. Intercommunal clashes were reported in Blue Nile State and in Geneina. By the beginning of May, the SAF claimed to have weakened the RSF and repelled it in multiple regions. The Sudanese police Central Reserve Forces joined SAF in the streets of Khartoum, claiming to have arrested several hundred RSF fighters. SAF announced an all-out attack on RSF in Khartoum using air strikes and artillery. Air strikes and ground offensives against RSF over the next few days damaged infrastructure but failed to dislodge RSF forces. Following further threats from Hemedti, al-Burhan gave a public video address from his besieged headquarters, vowing to continue fighting. On 19 May, al-Burhan officially removed Hemedti as his deputy in the Transitional Sovereignty Council, and replaced him with former rebel leader and council member Malik Agar. With al-Burhan trapped in Khartoum, Agar became de facto leader of the Sudanese government, assuming responsibility for peace negotiations, international visits and the day-to-day running of the country.
Treaty of Jeddah
International attention to the conflict resulted in the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) voting to increase monitoring of human rights abuses. On 6 May, delegates from SAF and RSF met directly for the first time in Jeddah for "pre-negotiation talks" sponsored by Saudi Arabia and the United States. The warring sides could not agree on a ceasefire, but signed the Treaty of Jeddah on 20 May, promising safe passage of civilians, protection of relief workers, and prohibition of the use of civilians as human shields. Deadly clashes resumed in Geneina, Darfur. UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Martin Griffiths expressed frustration at the refusal of both sides to end the fighting. The situation remained volatile, with both sides trading blame for attacks on churches, hospitals, and embassies. Casualties mounted, particularly in Geneina, where Arab militias loyal to RSF were accused of atrocities against non-Arabs. A temporary ceasefire was signed, but fighting persisted in Khartoum and elsewhere. Between 28 and 97 people were reportedly killed by the RSF and Arab militias when they attacked the predominantly Masalit town of Misterei in West Darfur on 28 May.
June–September 2023
==== Continued fighting in Khartoum ==== As June began, tanks were deployed in battle in Khartoum. The RSF took control of several important cultural and government buildings, including the National Museum of Sudan and the Yarmouk Military Industrial Complex. Acute food insecurity affected a significant portion of Sudan's population. By July, al-Burhan was still trapped at Army Headquarters, and SAF sent a relief column of troops, which was ambushed and defeated, with RSF claiming it had killed hundreds of soldiers and captured 90 vehicles, along with the column's commander. SAF increased the intensity of their airstrikes and artillery bombardment, often killing dozens of civilians in each strike. RSF shelling also intensified, with many civilian casualties. Heavy fighting continued through August across Khartoum. RSF laid siege to SAF's Armoured Corps base, breaching its defences and taking control of surrounding neighbourhoods. SAF also made offensives, with the RSF-controlled Republican Palace and Yarmouk Complex coming under SAF air bombardment. An offensive was launched against Yarmouk, but this was beaten back by RSF reinforcements. One of the few remaining bridges between Khartoum and Khartoum North was also destroyed by SAF to impede RSF maneuvers. On 24 August an SAF operation successfully rescued al-Burhan from his besieged Army Headquarters, allowing him to head to Port Sudan and hold a cabinet meeting there.
==== Diplomatic efforts ==== Ceasefires between the warring parties were announced but often violated, with SAF and RSF blaming each other, while the Sudanese government took action against international envoys. The Saudi embassy in Khartoum was attacked and an orphanage was evacuated amid the chaos. Sudan faced diplomatic strains with Egypt, causing difficulty for Sudanese refugees seeking entry. Al-Burhan, free for the first time since the start of the war, flew to Egypt to meet president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Al-Burhan then made a tour of numerous countries, heading to South Sudan, Qatar, Eritrea, Turkey, and Uganda. He proceeded to New York as head of the Sudanese delegation to the 78th United Nations General Assembly, where he urged the international community to declare the RSF a terrorist organization.
==== SPLM–N (Al-Hilu) involvement ==== The Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement–North (SPLM–N) broke a long-standing ceasefire in June, attacking SAF units in Kadugli, Kurmuk and Dalang, the latter coinciding with an attack by the RSF. SAF claimed to have repelled the attacks, while the rebels claimed to have attacked in retaliation for the death of one of their soldiers, and vowed to free the region from "military occupation". More than 35,000 were displaced by the fighting. Speculation arose as to whether al-Hilu's attacks were part of an unofficial alliance with RSF, or an attempt to strengthen al-Hilu's position in future negotiations. Civil society organizations supporting SPLM–N claimed its operations sought to protect civilians from possible RSF attacks. Al-Hilu's faction launched further offensives in July, moving into South Kordofan and gaining control of several SAF bases. SAF countered with heavy bombardment of SPLM–N positions. Further attacks by SPLM-N largely petered out after this, with a September assault on Kadugli being pushed back by SAF. Two years later in February 2025, SPLM–N (Al-Hilu) would officially ally with the RSF, signing the Sudan Founding Charter of the RSF-led Government of Peace and Unity.
==== Darfur front ==== In Darfur, fighting and bloodshed were particularly fierce around the city of Geneina, where hundreds died and extensive destruction occurred. RSF forces engaged in frequent violence against the Masalit of Geneina, leading to accusations of ethnic cleansing. On 4 August, RSF claimed it had taken full control of Central Darfur. A UN investigation in Darfur discovered numerous mass graves of Masalit civilians. RSF and Arab militias were additionally accused of killing lawyers, human rights monitors, doctors and non-Arab tribal leaders. The governor of West Darfur, Khamis Abakar, was abducted and killed in June, hours after accusing RSF of genocide and calling for international intervention in a TV interview. SAF conducted indiscriminate airstrikes against Darfur that killed many civilians, especially in Nyala. Tribal and rebel groups in Darfur began to declare allegiance to one of the two warring parties. A faction of the Darfur-based Sudan Liberation Movement led by Mustafa Tambour (SLM-T) joined in support of SAF. In contrast, the controversial Tamazuj rebel group allied with RSF, joined by the leaders of seven Arab tribes, including that of Hemedti. As September arrived, both sides made offensives in Darfur. RSF took control of several towns in West Darfur and attacked the market of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. SAF offensives saw success in Central Darfur, retaking parts of Zalingei from RSF. Fighting also began to spill over into North Kordofan, with SAF attacking RSF positions in the state capital of El-Obeid and clashes over the town of Um Rawaba. Both sides made withdrawals in late September, with RSF retreating from Um Rawaba while SAF withdrew from Tawila.
October–December 2023
SAF collapse in Darfur
By October 2023, SAF in Darfur was experiencing acute supply shortages due to RSF sieges, and had failed to utilize its air superiority to stem RSF advances. On 26 October, RSF captured Nyala, Sudan's fourth-largest city, after seizing control of SAF 16th Infantry Division headquarters. The fall of Nyala, a strategic city with an international airport and border connections to Central Africa, allowed RSF to receive international supplies more easily and freed up its forces for other campaigns. RSF troops proceeded to march into Zalingei, the capital of Central Darfur, as the SAF 21st Infantry Division fled without a fight. In Geneina, reports emerged that tribal elders were attempting to broker the peaceful surrender of the SAF garrison. SAF rejected the proposal, raising fears of an imminent RSF assault and causing civilians to flee across the border into Chad. RSF besieged the headquarters of the SAF 15th Infantry Division in Geneina, giving the garrison a six-hour ultimatum to surrender. The base was captured two days later, when the 15th withdrew and fled to Chad. The hundreds left behind were taken prisoner and paraded in RSF media with signs of abuse. Witnesses later reported mass atrocities by the RSF shortly after seizing the city, with a local rebel group claiming up to 2,000 people massacred in the suburb of Ardamata. With Geneina's fall, Ed Daein and El Fasher were the last remaining capitals in Darfur under SAF control, with both cities under heavy RSF pressure. The RSF stormed and plundered the town of Umm Keddada, east of El Fasher, after the SAF garrison withdrew. SAF troops in El Fasher itself were reported to be running low on food, water, and medicine due to the siege, and external forces noted SAF seemed incapable of stopping the RSF advance. Ed Daein fell in the early hours of 21 November, with RSF forces seizing the headquarters of the SAF 20th Infantry Division. SAF garrisons in East Darfur subsequently abandoned their positions and withdrew, allowing the RSF to occupy the area. In response to RSF gains in Darfur and subsequent abuses, the Justice and Equality Movement, Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Minnawi), and other smaller rebel factions renounced their neutrality and declared war on the RSF.
==== Peace negotiations stall ==== International attempts to negotiate peace had largely been dormant since the failed Treaty of Jeddah, but in late October 2023, the RSF and SAF met once more in Jeddah. These talks again failed, with neither side willing to commit to a ceasefire, though they again promised to open channels for humanitarian aid. On 3 December 2023, negotiations were halted when neither party fulfilled this promise. The East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) hosted a peace summit in early December, though SAF had previously accused Kenyan president William Ruto of supporting RSF. IGAD's talks appeared to make some progress, with Hemedti and al-Burhan agreeing to meet in person at some point in the future.
RSF crossing of the Nile
RSF attacked the town of Wad Ashana in North Kordofan on 1 October along a key commercial route. In West Kordofan, an uptick in fighting was reported, with RSF assaulting a major oil field in Baleela, south of Al-Fulah. Geolocated footage showed RSF fighters celebrating around Baleela Airport after allegedly capturing it. The Battle of Khartoum continued, with RSF seizing the town of al-Aylafoun, southeast of the capital, on 6 October, with RAF seizing key oil infrastructure. By late October, RSF controlled most of Khartoum but had failed to seize key military bases, while al-Burhan's government had largely relocated to Port Sudan.
RSF sought to capitalize on its gains by stepping up attacks on SAF positions in Khartoum and Omdurman. Days of fighting culminated in the destruction of the Shambat Bridge connecting Khartoum North to Omdurman over the Nile; the bridge's destruction severed a critical RSF supply route. This effectively cut off RSF forces in Omdurman, giving the SAF a strategic advantage. In an attempt to gain a new crossing over the Nile and supply its forces in Omdurman, RSF attacked the Jebel Aulia Dam in the village of Jabal Awliya. As the dam could not be destroyed without flooding Khartoum, its capture would give RSF a path over the Nile the SAF could not easily remove. A week-long battle commenced over the dam and village, ending in RSF victory on 20-21 November. On 5 December, local militias along with RSF soldiers attacked SPLM–N (al-Hilu) forces in the village of Tukma, southeast of Dalang in South Kordofan, killing four people and destroying the village. RSF leadership, not wanting hostilities with the then-neutral al-Hilu faction to escalate, condemned this attack, minimizing it as "tribal violence". On 8 December, the RSF entered Gedaref State for the first time. Pushing south from their gains around Jebel Aulia and Khartoum, RSF forces began to move into Gezira State on 15 December, advancing toward its capital Wad Madani. Elsewhere in Gezira the RSF made major gains, taking control of the city of Rufaa in the state's east and entering the Butana region. After several days of fighting the RSF seized the Hantoob Bridge on Wad Madani's eastern outskirts, crossing the Blue Nile and entering the city. The Sudanese Army put up little resistance in Wad Madani itself, the 1st Division withdrawing from the city as the RSF took over. The fall of Wad Madani was viewed as a major blow to SAF, as it dramatically widened the frontline and opened up large parts of the country to potential RSF offensives. The city's fall allowed RSF to capture most of Gezira and to make inroads in White Nile State, capturing the town of El Geteina. Within a few days RSF fighters had advanced to within 25 km of Sennar, the largest city in Sennar State. Over the next few weeks RSF forces ventured into rural areas of Al Qadarif State and River Nile State, without establishing a significant presence. In Sennar State the RSF made some further minor advances but had not attacked Sennar City by the year's end. Amid the deteriorating situation, the SAF were reported to be arming civilians while government officials in the east called on the population to mobilize. Al-Burhan gave a widely promoted public speech to soldiers in Red Sea State, promising to arm civilian militias to fight the RSF and to fight against 'colonialism', which was viewed by observers as a reference to Emirati support for the RSF.
January–April 2024
By January 2024, the war's economic costs had surpassed all prior armed conflicts since Sudanese independence in 1956 due to extensive destruction of infrastructure, particularly in urban areas such as the capital city of Khartoum.
==== Hemedti travels abroad ==== Following the fall of Wad Madani, efforts by IGAD to negotiate a ceasefire made progress as the SAF's weakened position made them more eager to enter talks. Whereas previously opposition from Islamist political groups to negotiation had prevented al-Burhan from committing to a specific date, now both he and Hemedti agreed to meet on 28 December. A day before the meeting was due, it was cancelled as Hemedti recanted his desire to attend. Instead the RSF leader went on a diplomatic tour, travelling on a chartered Emirati jet and meeting with several African national leaders. One visit that was particularly promoted was his visit to Rwanda, where he met with Rwandan president Paul Kagame and visited the Kigali Genocide Memorial. On the tour Hemedti also met with former Prime Minister Hamdok and his Taqaddum organisation in Addis Ababa, with the RSF agreeing in a declaration negotiated with the Taqaddum to release political prisoners, open up humanitarian aid corridors and negotiate further with the SAF. This tour was regarded by observers as an attempt by Hemedti to portray himself as the leader of Sudan and improve his international image, as his reputation had been severely damaged since the fall of Wad Madani due to large-scale looting by RSF fighters. On 5 January, al-Burhan vowed to continue the war against the RSF and rejected the latest peace efforts, declaring that war crimes committed by the RSF precluded negotiation. On 14 January, both Hemedti and Burhan received official invitations from IGAD to attend its upcoming summit on 18 January. Hemedti accepted the invitation, but Burhan refused. On 16 January, the Sudanese government suspended its ties with IGAD, accusing the body of violating Sudan's sovereignty. This effectively marked the end of IGAD's efforts to mediate peace talks.
==== Fighting in Kordofan and Gezira ==== As 2024 began, the RSF made attacks into South Kordofan, defeating SAF forces in the town of Habila in the Nuba Mountains and pushing toward Dalang. On 7 January the RSF attacked SAF positions in Dalang, meeting fierce resistance from the army and civilian militias. During the fighting the SPLM–N (al-Hilu) entered the city, taking control of several neighbourhoods. SPLM–N forces proceeded to attack the RSF, and the paramilitary retreated from the city. RSF fighters withdrawing from Dalang entered the city of Muglad in West Kordofan, easily taking control as the city had no organised SAF presence. West Kordofan had been relatively free of fighting for several months due to a local truce brokered by leaders of the Messiria tribe, but as tensions escalated rumours spread that the RSF were planning an attack on the encircled city of Babanusa and the Sudanese Army's 22nd Infantry Division garrisoning it. In January 2024, the RSF focused on consolidating its gains in Gezira State. Fighting was reported on 17 January east of El Manaqil, the last major town not under RSF control. The SAF delivered weapons to the city by helicopter, including selectively distributing them among civilians in the town, attempting to bolster its defences. Sudan's National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) selectively recruited and armed civilians based on perceived loyalty. On 24 January 2024, the RSF launched an attack on Babanusa after encircling the city for months. By 25 January, the RSF gained control of the city centre and entered the headquarters of the 22nd infantry division. Until March 2024, the RSF maintained its position in Gezira State but was unable to break through. The RSF recruited in Gezira State to try to capture territory in El-Gadarif from the SAF. The JEM, which has allied with the SAF, helped the SAF build up its forces in El-Gadarif for a counteroffensive to try to retake Wad Madani. In April 2024, the SAF and its allies began the counteroffensive, attacking from the east and west of Wad Madani in an attempt to retake it. Clashes were reported in Al-Madina Arab on 15 April. In December 2024, the SAF launched an offensive in southern Gezira. The SAF were able to make small progress, which involved recapturing the town of Wad el-Haddad, a town on the border of Sennar State. It also was able to recapture Um al-Qura, but the RSF reoccupied the village. In January 2025, the SAF made the first major military operation of 2025. The Sudanese Army was able to make large gains in Gezira and some gains in North Kordofan. On 8 January, the SAF had recaptured Haj-Abdallah after a tense battle that inflicted losses on the RSF. The SAF stated that seven RSF vehicles were destroyed. A day later, the SAF attacked RSF positions in Al-Shabarga in the southeastern part of the state, led by field commander Bassam Abu Satour, leading to the RSF's withdrawal and the SAF recapturing the city, while in the western part of the state, the SAF took control of the villages Mahla, Tahla, and Al-Kumar Al-Jaaliyeen. On 10 January, the SAF recaptured Um al-Qura while the Sudan Shield Forces took Wad al-Abyad. These successful offensives led to the SAF retaking control of Wad Madani on 11 January from three fronts.
After advancing in Gezira and Khartoum, the SAF launched a military operation in North Kordofan for the first time, after being on the defensive in Darfur and Kordofan from the start of the war. The SAF's "Sayyad Force", captured the entirety of the Umm Ruwaba district. By the start of February, the SAF had recaptured Al-Hasaheisa, Tambul, and Rufa'a. This left the RSF in control of only northwestern Gezira. The SAF then liberated the town of Er Rahad on 19 February, and by 23 February, the SAF had lifted the almost two-year siege of El Obeid.
==== SAF gains in Omdurman ==== The SAF gained ground in Omdurman in February 2024, linking up their forces in the northern part of the city and relieving a 10-month siege of their forces in the city centre. The SAF also took control of the Al-Hilal Stadium. The Omdurman front was the first area in Sudan where the SAF has carried out a sustained offensive operation and represents the first breakthrough for the SAF. On 12 March, the SAF defeated an attempted RSF counteroffensive in Omdurman and took control of the headquarters of the Sudan National Broadcasting Corporation. The RSF maintained its control of Khartoum and continued to threaten Khartoum North. By April 2024, fighting in Khartoum State was still ongoing, with the RSF in control of the southern and western parts of Omdurman and the SAF in control of the northern and eastern parts of Omdurman, with the RSF controlling the majority of Khartoum and Khartoum North. The SAF continued to prepare an offensive to relieve its surrounded bases in Khartoum North. As of March 2025, SAF controls the majority of the city. On 29 March, SAF forces announced the control of the Libya Market in Omdurman and seized weapons and equipment left behind by the RSF. On the same day, SAF launched new offensives into the city of Ombadda, west of Omdurman.
April–December 2024
Fighting in Darfur
On 15 April, during the Siege of El Fasher, at least nine civilians were killed in a renewed offensive by the RSF on the city of El Fasher in North Darfur. The Joint Darfur Force declared war on the RSF and allied with the SAF. The fighting in El Fasher diverted SAF resources from other areas, hampering planned counter-offensives to retake Khartoum and Wad Madani. In particular, the SAF has been using its limited aviation resources to carry out airstrikes in North Darfur and resupply El Fasher using airdrops. From April 2024, the conflict had been escalating in El Fasher, while the civilians remained trapped with no safety or food. In a June 2024 report, the International Crisis Group said the intensifying battle could lead to mass slaughter, and that there was a need for all sides to de-escalate. The report said the UN and the US should broker the de-escalation and must put pressure on the RSF and its main supporters, including the United Arab Emirates. Crisis Group said the UAE should push the RSF to stand down, and urged all parties to allow the civilians to flee, open the region for aid delivery and resume national peace talks. On 14 June 2024, the SAF announced that it had killed Ali Yaqoub Gibril, a top RSF commander, in El Fasher. The United States had sanctioned Yagoub in May 2024 for endangering civilians in Darfur. In June 2024, The New York Times reported that more than 40 villages had been burned in El Fasher since April 2024.
==== Fighting in Kordofan ==== As of May 2024, fighting is ongoing in Babanusa, West Kordofan. The RSF are conducting an offensive to attempt to take control of West Kordofan. Fighting was also reported in North Kordofan. On 20 June 2024, the RSF captured Al-Fulah, the capital of West Kordofan, after the SAF withdrew from the city after several hours of fighting. The SAF retreated to Babanusa, its one remaining base in Kordofan.
Fighting along the Nile
In May 2024, the RSF launched attacks against the SAF between Khartoum State and River Nile State, as well as in White Nile State near the border with Gezira State. The SAF prepared its forces in River Nile State, ahead of a potential invasion of Khartoum Bahri. In June 2024, the RSF were still in control of Khartoum and Khartoum North, though the SAF controlled one enclave in each that it supplies by airdrop. In late June 2024, the RSF began an assault in the areas surrounding the city of Sennar. RSF forces struck out to the west of the city, causing the SAF to bring in reinforcements in anticipation of an attack on Sennar itself. Instead RSF forces avoided Sennar and attacked south towards Singa, the capital of Sennar State, capturing the lightly defended town on 29 June. This prevented the SAF from reinforcing Sennar from the south, placing the city under increased pressure. Following the fall of Singa, SAF resistance collapsed across much of southern Sennar, which led to the RSF occupying the towns of Dinder, Mazmoun and Wad an-Nail with minimal SAF resistance. A united force consisting of the Gedaref-based 2nd SAF Infantry Division and a battalion of the JEM assaulted and retook Dinder on 1 July, but were driven out again by the RSF over the next few days. On 20 July, the RSF announced the death of Brigadier General Abdel Rahman Al-Bishi, its head of operations in Sennar and Blue Nile States, with Sudanese media reporting that he had been killed in a SAF airstrike. On 3 August, the RSF launched its first attack on Blue Nile State since the beginning of the war, with the group and the SAF contesting control over Al-Tadamun. On 15 August 2024, the Galgani massacre was carried out by the RSF, which killed at least 108 people, including at least 24 women and children.
==== SAF offensives ==== As September 2024 came, for the first time since the start of the war the balance of power seemed to be tipping towards the SAF. On 26 September, the SAF launched a major offensive against RSF positions in Khartoum. The attack on the city came from three fronts striking from the south, east and west of the capital. SAF airstrikes, which killed four and wounded 14, began at dawn followed by clashes within the city. The SAF reportedly captured three key bridges connecting Khartoum to other nearby cities, including the Omdurman Bridge which had previously acted as a line of separation between government and RSF control. Faced with an elusive enemy, the SAF became bogged down in urban fighting, with RSF snipers routinely paralyzing infantry advances. October 2024 was the deadliest month for Sudanese civilians since the war began. In Khartoum, the RSF have relentlessly shelled areas controlled by the SAF, which has amounted to daily indiscriminate bombardments of civilian areas. Escalating SAF airstrikes on RSF positions have caused dozens of civilian deaths. In October 2024, the SAF also launched counteroffensives in the states of Sennar and Gezira, which were successfully recaptured from the RSF. Starting on 20 October 2024, the RSF carried out the 2024 eastern Gezira State massacres, which killed at least 300 people and wounded at least 200 more. According to a report by the French newspaper Le Monde, as of November 2024, the war in Sudan has possibly entered its most dangerous phase since it began in April 2023. Both the SAF and RSF have officially ruled out settling the civil war through negotiations, with the only option on the table being total war. During the recent rainy season which brought a lull in the fighting, each side rearmed and restructured their forces. Many ordinary Sudanese, extending to the most serious critics of the SAF, have increasingly supported the SAF in response to RSF war crimes and atrocities. The SAF has become increasingly dependent on Islamist networks, as these movements have mobilized many civilians from popular resistance brigades. The Al-Bara' ibn Malik Battalion in particular is presently fighting on the Khartoum front lines against the RSF and has consequently gained popularity. On 23 November, the SAF retook Singa following an offensive.
